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Tiivistelmä:
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan palkkojen nimellistä ja reaalista jäykkyyttä alaspäin Suomessa
käyttäen yksilötason aineistoja työntekijöiden ja toimihenkilöiden palkoista vuosilta 1985–
2001. Tulokset osoittavat, että palkoissa oli 1990-luvulla joustavuutta makrotaloudellisessa
mielessä. Erityisesti 1990-luvun alun ankaran laman aikana reaalipalkkojen jäykkyys alaspäin
heikkeni ja suuri osa työntekijöistä koki reaalipalkan alenemisen. Yksilötason
palkanmuutosten perusteella palkat ovat kuitenkin Suomessa kiistatta jäykkiä alaspäin.
Kansainvälisen vertailun valossa Suomi kuuluu korkean reaalisen jäykkyyden maihin
eurooppalaisittainkin tarkasteltuna. Lamavuosien jälkeen palkkojen reaalijäykkyys on
palannut takaisin korkealle tasolle, vaikka työttömyys on pysynyt korkeana.
Abstract:
This paper analyses the flexibility of the Finnish labour markets from the microeconomic
perspective by focusing on individual-level wage changes for job stayers. The study covers
the private sector workers by using three separate data sets obtained from payroll records of
employers’ associations. Two main conclusions from wage formation emerge. First, there has
been macroeconomic flexibility in the labour market. Real wage rigidity declined during the
early 1990’s recession and a large proportion of workers experienced real wage cuts. We also
find that average wage changes respond negatively to an increase in unemployment. Second,
the evidence based on individual-level wage change distributions show that especially real
wages are definitely rigid in Finland in international comparison. In addition, the evidence
points out that individual-level wage changes have regained the high levels of real rigidity
during the late 1990s that prevailed in the 1980s, despite the continued high (but declining)
level of unemployment.
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31. Introduction
Deflation or low inflation may be problematic for the adjustment of the labour market.1 The
downward rigidity of nominal wages at the individual level of the economy may lead to
higher wage pressure during an episode of low inflation. The downward rigidity of nominal
wages implies that the downward adjustment of real wages is more limited during low
inflation, which could lead to higher wage pressure and equilibrium unemployment (e.g.
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry 1996; 2000 and Holden 2004).2 As Holden (2002) has stressed,
this feature is in contrast with the macroeconomic models based on nominal overlapping wage
contracts in which the rate of inflation per se is irrelevant for the rigidity in real wages.
Several studies have reported evidence for the feature that there are seldom cuts in nominal
wages of employees. One reason for this is that there are substantial costs associated with the
modification and the renegotiation of current employment terms (see Malcomson 1997). In
addition, fairness standards and implicit contracts may constitute obstacles for nominal wage
cuts.3 The evolution of the Finnish economy during the past few decades provides a good
opportunity to investigate these issues in detail. This emerges from the recent changes in the
inflation pattern owing to profound changes in the monetary framework and economic
activity. These underlying fluctuations are helpful in identifying the effects of inflation and
macroeconomic conditions on the adjustment of the labour market. An important additional
point is that a severe disruption in aggregate economic activity, like the early 1990’s recession
in Finland, can loosen traditional fairness standards in the labour market.
Finland has traditionally been a high-inflation country, where the rapid rate of wage and price
inflation was compensated by the frequent devaluations of currency in order to regain
competitiveness in export sectors. However, this pattern of macro-level adjustment of a small
open economy turned around when the Bank of Finland adopted inflation targeting after the
great slump of the early 1990s and the country joined to the third stage of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. In particular, in February 1993 the Bank of Finland adopted
a target rate of 2% per annum for the core inflation rate to be attained by 1995. The same
target was upheld by the European Central Bank (ECB). This target was low given the
4inflation history of three previous decades. The average inflation in Finland was 4.9% during
the 1960s, 11.4% during the 1970s, and 6.8% during the 1980s (Figure 1.1; upper panel).
Furthermore, there was a severe disruption in aggregate economy activity during the great
slump of the early 1990s that caused, in addition to disinflation, an unprecedented increase in
unemployment. The unemployment rate increased in three years (1991-1993) to almost 20%
from an average around 5% during 1980s (Figure 1.1; lower panel). Finland suffered its worst
recession of the twentieth century not in the 1930s but in the early 1990s (e.g. Böckerman and
Kiander 2002). Other Nordic countries and the United Kingdom had similar unemployment
patterns and many other qualitative similarities in their economic development. Deregulation
of financial markets lead to over-lending by banks, which caused an unsustainable boom in
consumption, investment spending and asset prices before the collapse. The depth of
Finland’s recession in the early 1990s was however unique in the context of the OECD
countries. An exogenous factor that partially explains this is the almost complete and long
lasting disappearance of the trade with the Soviet Union in 1990-1991, which constituted
about 20% of the Finnish exports. The reasons behind the great Finnish depression of the
early 1990s have been aptly described as “bad luck, bad banking, and bad policies”.4 The
active labour market policy in Finland has not been as ambitious as in Sweden, but it was still
effective enough to eliminate the long-term unemployment almost entirely during the 1980s
(e.g. Machin and Manning 1999). The good employment record of the 1980s was therefore
abruptly ruined at the beginning of the 1990s by a radical change from almost full
employment to mass unemployment. It is worth remembering that Finland’s unemployment
rate was always lower than the European Union average before the great slump of the early
1990s. It is possible that this major shock to unemployment caused changes in the way labour
markets work and affect the strictness of constraints to downward rigidity of wages.
These different episodes in terms of the rate of inflation and unemployment during the past
couple of decades provide a good background to study the relationships between wage
rigidities, inflation and unemployment. Our purpose in this paper is to examine the existence
and the importance of nominal and real rigidity of wages through the use of individual-level
micro data and the methods launched in the recent literature (e.g. Kramarz 2001 provides an
extensive survey of this literature from the point of view of methods). Dickens and Goette
(2005) have further developed those methods for the International Wage Flexibility Project.
5Micro data allows us to explicitly take into account the heterogeneity in the adjustment of
individual wages, in contrast to macro (time series) studies which focus solely on average
wage changes.
Our analysis focuses on the rigidity of base wages, which does not include performance-based
elements of compensation. We also limit to wage changes for persons who are remaining in
the same job, so we exclude flexibility related to changes in jobs within a firm or between
firms. Wage rigidity can be useful for restructuring, because it may foster reallocation of
resources between firms (Hibbs and Locking 2000), but we do not analyse these advantages
vs. disadvantages related to wage flexibility. It is clear that most of the burden of overall
adjustment falls on those workers who lose their jobs during recessions. Displaced workers
often suffer permanent wage losses, so the magnitude of wage cuts experienced in the
economy is underestimated by focusing on job stayers. With these limitations in mind we
attempt to document the amount and development of nominal and real wage rigidities in
Finnish manufacturing and private service sectors, and provide a brief international
comparison.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses different concepts of wage rigidity and
presents a summary of the relevant empirical literature. Section 3 introduces our data on
individual-level wage changes. We have in total three data sets available, which make it
possible to investigate the adjustment of the private sector in detail. Section 4 contains a
description of wage change histograms and reports results for the amount and the incidence of
wage cuts. Section 5 reports results for the sand and grease effects of inflation on the labour
market based on the methodology proposed by Groshen and Schweitzer (1999). Section 6
describes the methods developed by Dickens and Goette (2005) for the International Wage
Flexibility Project for analysing the amount of nominal and real wage rigidities based on
wage change distributions. Section 7 documents our results of distributional analysis of wage
changes for Finland. At the end of the section, estimation results on the macroeconomic
sensitivity of wage changes to unemployment are reported. The last section concludes and
Appendix 2 includes a description of wage-setting institutions in Finland.
62.  Definitions and research of wage rigidity
There are at least four different strands of research on wage rigidities. First, there is an old
macroeconomic tradition. Bruno and Sachs (1985) provide early results on nominal and real
rigidity based on aggregate time-series evidence. Bruno and Sachs (1985) argue that real
wages are flexible in the United States, but rigid in Europe. The opposite is true for nominal
wages, which are more rigid in the United States than in Europe. It is important to note that
the definitions for nominal and real rigidity are not the same as the ones in the more recent
literature that is based on micro-level data. Bruno and Sachs (1985) define nominal wage
flexibility as a response of nominal wages with respect to the rate of inflation. Real wage
flexibility refers to a response of real wages with respect to the unemployment rate. Later, for
instance, Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) have applied these concepts for a number of
OECD countries including Finland. Nominal wage rigidity appears to be higher in Finland
(along with U.S. and Canada) than in most of the countries included, but real wage rigidity is
on the average level among those countries. The earlier empirical research on the adjustment of
wages in Finland has almost exclusively followed this line of research and applied macro-
economic aggregate data on average wage changes. Pehkonen (1991; 1999) provides examples
of this strand of the literature. The aggregate studies have discovered, for instance, that a 1-
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate tends to yield a 1-2% decline in the level of
real wages.
Second, in more recent research based on the concept of the wage curve by Blanchflower and
Oswald (1995; 2005), it has been typical to argue that there are no major differences in the
flexibility of labour markets in terms of real wages across countries. These studies combine
micro-level data on wages with the regional unemployment rates in order to estimate the
elasticity of individual-level wages to an increase in the regional unemployment rate. Faggio
and Nickell (2005) is a recent contribution in this line of research for UK. They find that wage
flexibility to labour market conditions has increased since mid 1980’s, which is partly
explained by the decline in national pay bargaining. Finnish studies on wage curve (e.g.
Pekkarinen 2001) have established that the elasticity of real wage level with respect to the
regional unemployment rate in Finland is -0.1%, which is a common finding for other
countries in the literature.
7Third, many studies have used surveys of employers to examine factors that support
resistance to wage cuts. For instance, Campbell III and Kamlani (1997) provide U.S. survey
evidence on the reasons for wage rigidity based on a sample of 184 firms. Bewley (1998)
provides evidence on wage rigidities based on interviews that are targeted to managers. Franz
and Pfeiffer (2006) present results for Germany. In general, the results reported in these
studies support the idea that employers are not willing to cut wages, because they fear that it
will lead to the erosion of working morale, adverse selection in worker turnover or increases
in turnover costs. In particular, Agell and Lundborg (2003) report that the amount of wage
cuts has not increased in Sweden despite the rise in the unemployment rate during the 1990s
based on survey data for Sweden. Agell and Bennmarker (2002) however report that, when
facing underbidding in wages or working conditions from outsiders, employers almost always
reject these offers. As reasons for not accepting underbidding, employers report that it is
‘against firm’s personnel policy’ or ‘creates conflicts’ more often than ‘union resistance’ or
‘against existing contracts’. Alho et al. (2003) examine various aspects of collective
bargaining in Finland using a survey that was targeted to the representatives of employers and
employees. It shows that over half of the Finnish employers think that the current collective
bargaining does not provide enough opportunities for wage flexibility. Not surprisingly,
employees hold opposite views. However, there is also evidence in this survey that workers
would prefer a combination of wage cuts and employment adjustment to pure employment
adjustment with rigid wages when faced with a need to cut labour costs in a recession (see
Vainiomäki 2005 for this interpretation). Therefore, it seems that even in unionized labour
markets like in Sweden or Finland also other reasons are important for wage rigidity in
addition to simple union or worker resistance.
Fourth, there is a strand of literature that uses micro-level data in order to estimate the extent
of nominal and real rigidities in the labour market. This approach that takes advantage of
individual-level wage change distributions has gained a lot of ground in more recent years.
There have been several different methodological approaches in this literature on micro-level
rigidity of wages. Descriptive accounts focus on the lack of wage cuts and the sweep-up of
wage cuts to wage freezes due to downward nominal or real wage rigidity. Non-parametric
methods based on the symmetry assumption of the counterfactual wage change distribution
attempt to measure the share of wage changes that is affected by wage rigidity. Further studies
attempt to estimate parameters describing the extent of downward wage rigidity, using
8parametric assumptions about the distribution of wage changes. There has not been any deep
consensus about the prevalence of nominal and real wage rigidities in the labour market,
although many studies include evidence consistent with downward wage rigidities. One
reason for differences in the results is that measurement error in wages contaminates wage
changes and thereby biases numbers of wage cuts (upwards) and wage freezes (downwards).
Because the extent of measurement error varies between studies and they may account for its
effects differently, they end up with different views on the importance of wage rigidities.
Kramarz (2001) and Holden (2004) provide comprehensive surveys of this literature. For
examples using different approaches, see McLaughlin (1994), Card and Hyslop (1996), Kahn
(1997), Altonji and Devereux (1999), Fehr and Goette (2000), Smith (2000), Nickell and
Quintini (2003), and Christofides and Stengos (2003).
To our knowledge there are only two earlier empirical studies of the micro-level wage
rigidities in Finland. Vartiainen (2000) investigated the nominal adjustment of wages from
1980 to 1995 by using the same individual-level data source for manual workers in
manufacturing as in this study. He discovered, based on the distributions of nominal wage
changes across individuals, that nominal wage reductions are quite common for Finnish
manufacturing workers. In particular, about a third of all manual manufacturing workers
experienced a decline in their nominal wages during the depression of the early 1990s.
However, Vartiainen (2000) does not restrict the analysis to job stayers, which has usually
been the case in other studies investigating the magnitude of nominal wage adjustment at the
individual-level. Hence, a certain amount of the nominal adjustment observed by Vartiainen
(2000) is most likely produced by the turnover of workers, which is in Finland at about the
same level as in other industrialized countries (Ilmakunnas and Maliranta 2003). His Probit-
estimations indicate that reductions in nominal wages are more common for young workers
and women and in small plants. Snellman (2004) focuses on nominal pay cuts for
manufacturing manual and non-manual (salaried) workers and finds that they tend to
concentrate to certain plants.
93. The data
The data for this study comes from ‘wage surveys’ of two Finnish employers’ associations.
Manufacturing sector manual (hourly paid) and non-manual (salaried, monthly paid) workers
are covered by separate surveys conducted by TT (Teollisuus ja työnantajat). Private service
sector workers are covered by a survey from PT (Palvelutyönantajat). TT (the central
organization for the manufacturing sector employers) and PT (the central organization for the
service sector employers) merged in spring 2004. The new employers’ association is called
the Confederation of Finnish Industries (Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto). The wage surveys are
still conducted separately for each sector. The wage information in these surveys originates
directly from the payroll records of companies, so they can be characterized as administrative
or register based data. Therefore, these data are usually considered to be very accurate by their
nature, and the sources of measurement error in surveys of individual workers, like recall or
rounding error, are not expected to be a great problem in these data. However, our results in
this study point to some other sources of error in measuring the hourly wage rate for manual
workers as discussed below.
The survey frame of the data consists of the member firms of both associations in each
reference period. Although the survey is mandatory for firms with over 30 employees (the
limit varies somewhat by industry), some non-response will occur. This is concentrated on
smaller firms that are also less often members of the associations. The coverage of the TT
data is better than that of PT, since service firms are smaller on average. The firm coverage is
still good, although some variation has occurred during the years. For example, some firms
have changed their membership from TT to PT or vice versa, and mergers and splits and other
types of firm restructuring has happened. Also, due to privatization some new sub-sectors
have joined to these private-sector associations. This has been more common in services. In
order to keep the target population more stable, we have excluded some sub-sectors from the
data. To identify employers in TT data there are firm codes and ‘response-unit’ codes. There
has been a brake in the firm coding system during our observation period, but the response
unit codes are consistent over time, so we use those to identify the employer of individuals.
The response-unit usually refers to an establishment of a firm. In the service sector only the
firm code exists in the data, so we use it.
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Our data are well representative at employee/worker level, since these TT/PT firms have
rather good systems for collecting wage data. However, there are missing or erroneous
identity codes for individuals, and hence some individuals may be excluded from wage
change data. In the early 1980s these problems were so prevalent in TT data that we have
dropped those years altogether from our analyses, but during later years these problems are
rare. These data had not been used for research purposes before this study, so some checking
of data quality was necessary on a number of details. We have tried to improve the data
quality afterwards when it was possible using clarifying information from the data owners.
The structure of these data is quite similar across sectors. They provide detailed information
about wages and working time, and some information about employees’ individual
characteristics (such as age and gender). However, there are two major differences in these
data sets across the sectors: the timing of observations and the wage concept. For manual
manufacturing workers the data covers the situation during the last quarter of each year, but the
situation during one month of each year for non-manual (salaried) manufacturing workers
(August before 1995 and October in and after 1995) and the private service sector workers
(September before 1993 and December in and after 1993). This change-over causes no major
problems for our analysis of downward rigidities because the observation month is delayed and
there is a point of normal contractual wage increase between the two observations (otherwise we
might overestimate downward rigidity). We might also underestimate the rigidity by lengthening
the observation interval if more than the usual one or two annual contract wage rises fell on the
interval. However, this is not the case for either sector. The observation interval changes only by
two or three months, so the change-over years should be comparable to other years.
The wage concept differs across sectors. Hourly rate has been applied for manual workers in
manufacturing, whereas monthly rate (salary) for non-manual workers in manufacturing and
for service sector workers. The monthly rate for non-manual workers in manufacturing is
defined as ‘the fixed basic monthly salary paid for regular working time’. This fixed salary is
based on the ‘demands’ of the job or tasks performed in it and the contract based wages
determined for these ‘demand classes’ of jobs, and an additional person specific component
based on personal competence. Respectively, in services the monthly rate is defined as the
‘personal wages paid for regular working time’, which is very close to the former definition.
It includes such personal and ‘task’ specific bonuses (merit pay), which are paid at the same
amount in each month. These monthly wages exclude such components of wages, which are
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chancing naturally or are not part of the ‘basic wage’ of a person. Excluded are among others
overtime pay, shift work, evening or Sunday bonuses, fringe benefits, and performance based
payments, commissions, ‘profit sharing’ and similar payments. It should be noted, that this
monthly wage is not simply a ‘minimum’ salary based on contracted wage scales, but includes
a person-specific component. Furthermore, firms and local unions can agree on firm specific
wages that exceed the minimum requirements of national contracts. Such firm specific
arrangements can also be reduced by mutual consent of the firm and local union. In principle,
these person and firm specific components in wages therefore provide possibilities for both
upward and downward flexibility in wages even without cuts in contracted minimum wages.
For measuring hourly rate for manufacturing manual workers there are two options: the wage
per hour for regular working time, or the wage per hour for straight time work (time-rate). We
use the time-rate, because it is a better measure of the person’s ‘basic’ wage. The regular-time
measure includes compensation from all types pay, that is, time-rate, piece-rate and
performance based pay. Therefore, it can change if the structure of hours of work performed
as time work, piece rate work or performance work has changed. Such wage changes reflect
changes in person’s effort of work which is problematic for the purposes of studying
downward rigidity of wages. A wage cut arising from less hours or less effort in piece-rate
work is probably not what is meant by flexible wages, rather it refers to changes in the ‘basic
wage’ of persons. We therefore use the hourly wage measure for time-rate work. It is
calculated by dividing the wage bill for time-rate hours by hours worked on time-rate during
the fourth quarter of each year. This hourly wage measure therefore excludes piece-rate and
performance work, overtime pay (and hours), and shift work, evening, night and Sunday
bonuses, as well as bonuses based on working conditions.  However, it includes any firm
specific wages paid above minimum contracts, and any ‘personal bonus’ incorporated in each
person’s individual ‘wage rate per hour’ that is used in remuneration for his/her time-work. In
some industries the average magnitude and distribution of such personal bonuses is governed
in the contracts, but in others they are more informal. Again, these person and firm specific
components in wages provide possibilities for both upward and downward wage changes, and
deviations from the wage changes in centrally negotiated contracts.
A drawback of using the time-rate hourly wage is that it leads to the omission of some
individuals from the data, who are 100% paid on piece rate or performance pay. This may
lead to non-random selection. The straight time hourly wage can also be based on few hours,
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but it is not clear that this should produce any problems as such, as long as the wage bill and
hours data are otherwise accurate. However, there may be problems in allocating hours and
corresponding wage components for a particular quarter. This induces potential measurement
error for hourly wages in manufacturing. In later analysis, we find that the measurement error
in wage changes for hourly-paid manual workers is significantly larger than for monthly-paid
non-manual and the service sector workers.
The wage changes used in our analyses are constructed for job stayers, that is, only workers
who have the same employer and the same occupation during the two consecutive years are
included. It is standard in micro-level studies of wage rigidity to restrict to wage changes of
persons who remain in the same job. Wage changes related to job promotions or demotions
and employer switches reflect changes in job tasks, working conditions and location
amenities, which would contaminate measurement of wage rigidity.8 Moreover, in order to
control for the variation arising from changing working hours for non-manual and service
sector workers’ monthly wages, it is required that the “regular weekly hours” are the same in
both years.
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4. Description of the micro-level adjustment of wages
4.1. The distribution of wage changes
The downward rigidity of nominal or real wages manifests in the distribution of wage changes
in a specific manner. Downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) means that a negative wage
change (wage cut) is not observed for a person affected by DNWR. Such a person faces a
wage freeze (zero wage change), instead. If DNWR is prevalent, i.e. affecting a large share of
workers who would obtain wage cuts without wage rigidity, then the share of observations
below zero is reduced and they are piled up to zero. In the wage change distribution there will
be missing mass below zero and a spike at zero. If the wage change distribution would be
symmetric without DNWR it will become asymmetric (skewed to right), because of nominal
wage rigidity. Histograms of wage changes are therefore useful in looking for signs of wage
rigidity (see Figure 4.1 for an illustration of the effects of rigidities on wage change
distribution).
Downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) affects the wage change distribution analogically; with
real wage cuts swept up to expected inflation. Therefore, missing mass below expected
inflation and concentration of observations to expected inflation are symptoms of DRWR. A
complication is that expected inflation of wage setters is not known. Furthermore, to the
extent that expected inflation vary across firms and individuals, observations pile up to an
interval around the mean of expected inflation, the wideness of this interval reflecting the
dispersion of inflation expectations in wage setting. In practice, real wage rigidity can be
evaluated using observed inflation bearing in mind that the observations may not concentrate
exactly to observed inflation to the extent that there were expectation errors in a particular
year.
Centralized and extensive collective bargains cause also concentration of wage changes in the
distribution to the location of contracted wage increase, to the extent that it is binding for a
large share of workers. Industry-based agreements can induce several spikes or a wider area
of concentration to the wage change distributions. In contrast, centralized income policy
agreements with wide coverage are likely to cause only one notable point of concentration to
the wage change distribution. (Appendix 2 contains a description of wage formation
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institutions and negotiated contracts in Finland over the period of investigation of wage
rigidities.)
In the estimation of wage rigidities (later in this paper), it is assumed for computational
reasons that the underlying true wage change distribution is discrete (Dickens and Goette
2005). The log wage change can take one of 76 values ranging from –0.245 to 0.495 in steps
of 0.01 or it can take the value zero. Very large and small wage changes are eliminated to
scale down the effect of outliers. For extreme negative and positive wage changes, these
groups contain often few or no observations, because wage change distributions are usually
concentrated. We present the observed wage change distributions in Figures 4.2-4.4 using the
same classification of the data as in the estimation of wage rigidities. In practice, these
distributions are ‘histograms’ of wage changes with each bar representing the share of
observations falling to the one percentage point interval around the class midpoint, except the
zero ‘bin’ which is a very narrow range around zero; wage change being within the interval (-
0.017%, 0.017%).
Figures 4.2a-4.2c present bar charts (‘histograms’) of the distributions of nominal wage
changes of hourly wages for manual manufacturing workers for each year from 1986 to 2000.
Figures 4.3a-4.3c and 4.4a-4.4b present the distributions for monthly salaries of non-manual
manufacturing and service sector workers, respectively. Actual inflation is shown with a black
bar and contract wage increase with a grey bar. When contract wage increase and actual
inflation fall on the same one percentage point interval, the bar is shown as black. The
contract wage increases are the percentage wage changes implied by contracts signed in each
bargaining round as reported in Marjanen (2002) and they can be different for the three
sectors.
The bar charts for all sectors show that there tends to be a peak in the distribution of nominal
wage changes near the level of nominal wage increase stipulated by current collective
agreements. The share of observations below the contact wage rise also seems less than in a
symmetric distribution, that is, there is a cut-off in the distribution at the contract wage rise or
somewhere near it, and missing mass below that point. In most years actual inflation is quite
close to the contract wage rise, so it is difficult to separate the effect of real wage rigidity from
the effect of contracts on wage changes. Usually the contract wage rise seems to determine
the concentration of observations more than inflation. These features are consistent with the
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notion that the final impact of the wage bargaining depends mainly on general wage increase
that is agreed upon in the binding collective agreement, and it might be dubbed as contract
wage rigidity. Alternatively, these features indicate that the (centralized) bargaining
institutions are the means that effectively produce real wage rigidity in wage setting.
However, they may also be means to secure concerted wage moderation as discussed in the
next section on wage cuts.
There is not much evidence for nominal wage rigidity in wage setting in Finland in the sense
that there seems to be no spikes at zero wage change during normal times in the distributions
for manual workers, and only very small spikes for non-manual and service sector workers in
some years. These small zero spikes could also be created by so-called menu costs that
constitute obstacles for very small nominal wage changes both upward and downward.
However, during the severe recession years there was essentially a wage ‘freeze’ in 1992 and
1993 due to a centrally bargained extension of the previously prevailing contracts. This
centralized wage freeze creates the large increase in the frequency of zero nominal wage
changes in these particular years (more prominent for non-manual and service sector workers;
for service sector this freeze also continued to 1994). The timing of contract starting date
contributes to the large fraction of zero wage changes in 1997. The new contract started in
1.1.1998, so there were no contractual wage increases during 1997. It might even be
conjectured that any wage changes observed in 1997 must be due to other factors than
contractual pay rises, which makes this year’s distribution an interesting comparison point for
other years.
However, the distributions for the non-manual manufacturing and service sector workers are
highly asymmetric (or missing) below zero nominal wage change suggesting the possible
presence of downward nominal wage rigidity in these sectors. It should be noted though, that
the lack of nominal wage cuts can also be induced by real rigidity. The lack of or small zero
spikes indicates that this is mostly the case in Finland.
There have been four industry-based contracts during our data period, in 1988, 1994, 1995
and 2000. It is not strikingly evident from the histograms that wage change distributions in
these years have been very different from the histograms in surrounding years with
centralized contracts, but there seems to be some tendency that the support of the mode of
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wage changes is wider. This is consistent with somewhat more variation across industries in
the ‘average’ wage change in years of industrial contracts.
In the 1980’s the distributions of wage changes for non-manual workers are somewhat
different compared with manual manufacturing workers in the sense that there are indications
of more than a single peak in the distributions. This most likely reflects that there were
different subgroups of workers within non-manuals with their own contracts leading to
different average wage changes for these groups. The data also includes higher level non-
manuals for whom individual wage contracts are in use. For both manual and non-manual
manufacturing workers it is also notable that after the early 1990s recession the wage change
distributions seem in general different from those before the recession in that the distributions
have become more concentrated during the late 1990’s.
4.2. The amount of wage cuts and the rate of inflation
Despite the overwhelming role of collective agreements, there is a great deal of heterogeneity
in the adjustment of nominal wages at the individual-level as indicated by the dispersion of
distributions each year. There are also some workers experiencing nominal or real wage cuts
in each year. The amount of wage decreases is a crude measure of flexibility of individual-
level wage changes. Considering the frequency of nominal wage decreases there is evidently
substantially more indication of wage rigidities for non-manual manufacturing workers and
for the private service sector workers (Table 4.1). The share of non-manual and service sector
workers experiencing nominal wage cuts has been low, around 1-5%, even during the great
slump of the early 1990s. This pattern is in contrast to the adjustment of nominal wages for
manual workers during the recession years 1991-1993, when the share of workers with
negative wage changes increased to 17%-36%. However, in normal times the number of
nominal wage cuts for job stayers is not particularly high even for manual workers. The share
of negative wage changes for manuals has been around 5–11 % in normal conditions, which is
about half of the similar proportion in the UK (see Nickell and Quintini, 2003).
The share of real wage declines behaves more similarly across sectors, being very high during
the recession years of 1991-1993 (58-87% depending on sector and year; see Table 4.1). This
arises from a large number of wage increases that lie between zero and the inflation rate. This
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holds in particular for the non-manual and service sector workers, which explains the larger
difference between shares of real and nominal wage declines for these groups. This means
that nominal wage moderation by collective agreements and a positive inflation rate during
the early 1990s recession made it possible to implement real wage cuts for a large proportion
of employees without implementing nominal wage cuts. In this sense, centralized bargaining
made the adjustment of the labour market to the severe shock possible by relaxing the real
wage rigidity constraint during the early 1990s recession. Hence, the Finnish experience is
consistent with the idea that wage rigidities can be at least somewhat relaxed under extreme
distress of employers and threat to employment. However, it seems that the nominal wage
rigidity formed the ultimate constraint for this adjustment.
The average nominal wage decline for those workers that experience a wage decline has been
higher in the service sector compared with manual and non-manual workers in manufacturing
(Table 4.2). The same applies for average real wage declines comparing service sector and
non-manuals, but not always for manuals. The average real wage decline is smaller than the
average nominal wage decline, because the former contains a large number of small real wage
declines.
In order to analyse the real consequences of downward nominal wage rigidity and inflation
Nickell and Quintini (2003) regress the share of negative real wage change on the inflation
rate and selected control variables for changes in the median and dispersion of the real wage
change distribution. Their results using UK New Earnings Survey over the period 1976-1999
show that an increase in the rate of inflation produces an increase in the share of workers that
experience negative real wage change. This result is in line with the notion stressed in the
literature that downward nominal rigidity and low inflation together prevent the necessary
downward adjustment in real wages. However, Nickell and Quintini (2003) argue that their
estimated effect of inflation is not large enough to be a strong argument for raising the long-
run inflation target.
Manual manufacturing workers is the segment of the Finnish labour market that is most
promising for the Nickell and Quintini (2003) type regressions. First, there is a reasonable
amount of negative wage changes. Second, these wage changes are available for the whole
period of investigation, which is necessary to have enough variation in inflation. The baseline
model reveals that the rate of inflation is not statistically significant in explaining the share of
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workers that have experienced negative real wage changes (Table 4.3). This is not surprising,
because the tabulation of wage cuts in Table 4.1 shows that the proportion of negative real
wage changes was substantial in Finnish manufacturing during the early 1990s recession
when inflation was declining. Hence, our result could be an anomaly related to the recession
and associated disinflation. When we include an indicator for the years 1991-1993 the
relationship between inflation and the share of workers that experience negative real wage
change is statistically significant at 10 % level. The quantitative magnitude of our result about
the impact of inflation on the share of workers experiencing negative real wage changes is
about twice as large as that reported by Nickell and Quintini (2003) for the UK.
4.3. The incidence of wage cuts at the individual level
The Probit models can be used to evaluate the factors that have contributed to the likelihood
of wage declines for job stayers in different segments of the Finnish labour markets during the
1990s.9 These models include individual characteristics (such as age, experience, working
hours, region and gender), employer characteristics (size, female share and industry), and the
form of remuneration (as lagged share of performance pay and change in it) as explanatory
variables for the probability of the individual worker experiencing a wage cut.
The results reveal that there are relatively few factors that have a common influence on the
likelihood of wage decline across the segments of the Finnish labour markets. However, the
hours of work and the size of a plant/firm play a similar role in all sectors in explaining the
incidence of wage cuts. Full-time workers, who constitute the firm insiders, have a lower
likelihood of nominal and real wage decline. Moreover, nominal and real wage declines tend
to be more common in small plants, where there is perhaps more need for the adjustment of
labour costs due to product market effects.
The persistence of wage cuts shows interesting differences across the segments of the Finnish
labour markets. Nominal wage declines are more transitory by their nature within the
segments in which they are more common. In other words, nominal wage declines have been
more common for manual workers in manufacturing during the 1990s, but they have been
more transitory by their nature at the same time. In contrast, for non-manual workers in
manufacturing and for service sector workers, declines in nominal wages have been less
common by their frequency, but they have been more persistent than for manual workers.
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5.  The sand and grease effects of inflation
5.1. The methodology proposed by Groshen and Schweitzer
Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) identify the sand and the grease effects of inflation on the
labour market, based on a model of wage formation adopted in large U.S. firms, as follows.
The identification procedure assumes that in the first stage of wage formation firms form
inflation expectations and decide on the change in aggregate wages in their firms. The so-
called sand effect of inflation comes from the fact that there can be errors in inflation
expectations by firms, which lead to inappropriate real wages and misallocation of resources.
These errors are more severe in a regime of high (and therefore more fluctuating) inflation.
The sand effect of inflation implies an increase in dispersion of wage changes across firms in
a given occupation as there is an increase in the rate of inflation. Empirically the sand effect
of inflation is captured by the firm dummies in a regression of wage changes.
In the second stage of wage formation, the change in aggregate wages is allocated across
occupations (or jobs) within firms. In practice, the second stage of wage formation can be
done, for example, in different divisions of the firms. The so-called grease effect of inflation
emerges from the stylized feature that an increase in the rate of inflation helps to decrease real
wages in declining occupations within firms in the presence of downward nominal wage
rigidity. The grease effect of inflation implies an increase in dispersion of wage changes
across occupations in a given firm as there is an increase in the rate of inflation. The grease
effect of inflation is captured by the occupation dummies in the wage change regression.
Empirically the sand and grease effects are examined by first regressing wage changes of
individuals on occupation and firm dummies for each year separately, controlling for the
region effects. The time series for the standard deviations of the firm and occupation effects
are then regressed on inflation in order to look for the sand and grease effects of inflation. It is
expected that both sand and grease effects increase with inflation. In practice, these effects are
likely to saturate when inflation increases further, which is empirically captured by including
a quadratic term of inflation in the sand and grease regressions below.
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5.2. ANOVA models for wage changes
The first stage ANOVA-regressions of individual wage changes on occupation, firm and
region dummies are presented in Table 5.1.10 In practice, these models pool all years and
include occupation, firm and region dummies interacted with year as explanatory variables, so
that occupation and firm effects are estimated separately for each year. Occupation and
employer effects are statistically significant in all sectors. This means that occupation and
employer variations in wage changes are distinguishable from each other over the period as
required by the identification of sand and grease effects. The models account for 27-31% of
the variation of wage changes in different sectors. This is almost the same as the 27% share in
Groshen and Schweitzer (1999).
Wage changes common to all job-cells in each year and region (region*year effect) explain
about 14-18% of observed variation of wage changes. Variation of wage changes across firms
accounts for 30-40% of the variation explained by the model and 8-12% of the total variation.
This employer effect is stronger than the occupation effect, which constitutes only about 2-5%
of explained variation in wage changes. Hence, the employer effect dominates the adjustment
of wages in the Finnish labour market. The higher share of occupation effect for manual
workers is probably due to more detailed occupation classification which contains also some
industry-specific occupations, whereas non-manual and service sectors have common
occupations across industries.
5.3. Development of the dispersion of wage changes and firm and occupation effects
There are two common elements across sectors in the development of total variation of wage
changes (Figure 5.1). First, the standard deviations of wage changes increased during the
economic upswing in the 1980s for manual and non-manual workers, and second, they
declined during the great slump of the early 1990s. A difference in the trends seems to exist
between sectors. The dispersion of wage changes for manual manufacturing workers has
decreased since the end of the 1980s. At the end of the 1990s the standard deviation was
about the same as during the depression years, but lower than during the late 1980s. On the
other hand, for non-manual and service sectors the dispersion of wage changes has increased
back to the pre-recession level. As a result, dispersions of wage changes have become more
similar across sectors during the 1990s. This most likely reflects comprehensive income
21
policy agreements that characterized wage formation during the period. In addition, there is
some evidence that the total dispersion in wage changes has been larger during the years of
high inflation.11 This is consistent with both sand and grease effects. The grease effect arises
because higher inflation allows more dispersion of wage changes below the mean wage
change instead of concentration at zero. The sand effect arises because higher inflation
(uncertainty) creates more errors in firm level wage changes.
The standard deviations of firm and occupation effects are at a higher level for manual
workers than for non-manual and service sectors workers (Figure 5.2). In addition, the
standard deviation across employers is about twice that of occupations in all sectors. The level
of standard deviations has been quite stable across years except during the upswing of the late
1980s and the downturn in the early 1990s, especially for firm effects. For manual workers
there is some indication of a declining trend in standard deviations over the period.
5.4. The sand and grease regressions
The explanatory variable in regressions of standard deviations of employer and occupation
effects on inflation is actually inflation plus labour productivity growth (CPIP). Labour
productivity growth is added to inflation, because uncertainty regarding the growth of
productivity adds directly to the sand effect owing to the increase of the overall confusion in
wage setting. Labour productivity growth is also added to the grease effect, because it makes
possible for firms to reduce real labour cost given the level of nominal wage increases, so
productivity growth relaxes the constraint of downward wage rigidity in the same way as
higher inflation. (Appendix 1 contains the exact definitions of macroeconomic variables that
are used in the models.)
The standard quadratic versions of the sand and grease regressions fit poorly to the standard
deviations of firm and occupation effects in all sectors (Table 5.2). CPIP and CPIP squared
are both statistically insignificant in all models and the shape of the fitted curve is often
against the expected concave form. This means that we are not able to identify sand or grease
for Finland by using the methodology proposed by Groshen and Schweitzer (1999).
We tested the robustness of this conclusion in detail (Tables 5.3-5.6). First, there are quite few
observations for each sector, so we estimated also a model pooling all sectors and adding
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sector dummies. This does not change the overall conclusions from the sectoral models (Table
5.2). Second, since the quadratic terms were not significant we estimated linear models (not
reported). These suggest a positive relationship for manual workers between occupation and
firm standard deviations and CPIP, but no correlation for non-manual workers and negative
relationship for the service sector (not significant for the occupation effect). Third, there may
have been other changes over time in addition to inflation that needs to be taken into account.
However, the inclusion of a simple time-trend to the basic model does not change the above
results (Table 5.3). There was also a sharp rise in unemployment during the early 1990s
recession, simultaneously with the disinflation. Hence, it may be important to control for
unemployment when looking at inflation effects on wage dispersion. However, the inclusion
of the unemployment rate to the basic version of sand and grease regressions does not change
the results (Table 5.4). Fourth, higher centralization (co-ordination) in wage negotiations may
reduce the dispersion of wage changes overall as well as in firm and occupation dimensions.
We included to the estimated equation variables that capture changes in centralization of wage
negotiations over the period either as an indicator for industry level bargaining or as the share
of workers outside centralized bargaining (Table 5.5). Decentralization exerts a small positive
effect on the firm standard deviation (sand effect), but no effect on occupation standard
deviation. Importantly, the sand and grease effects of CPIP remain insignificant. Finally, we
decomposed the inflation effect to expected inflation and an inflation surprise. This distinction
can be motivated as a check of the identification strategy as proposed by Groshen and
Schweitzer (1999). The grease effect arises from the flexibility in real wage adjustment
provided by expected inflation, but not by inflation surprises. On the other hand, inflation
surprises can give rise to the sand effect related to errors in wage setting. Therefore,
occupation variation should be mostly related to expected inflation and inflation surprises
should primarily affect the employer variation. Our results in Table 5.6 are not consistent with
this prediction. The surprise variables are no less significant than expected variables in
occupation regressions, and the surprise variables are not generally more significant in firm
regressions compared to occupation regressions. This raises serious doubts about the
suitability of the proposed identification strategy in Finnish labour markets.
5.5. Discussion
Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) assume that there is a two-stage wage determination that is
common in large companies in the United States, but the framework does not capture the
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heart of the collective bargaining system that has been applied in Finland during the period of
the investigation. In the Finnish collective bargaining, centralized bargaining bodies aggregate
inflation expectations across firms and employees before there is any agreement on nominal
wage changes. In turn, the nominal wage change stipulated in the collective agreements has
obviously been an important element in the determination of the inflation rate during the past
few decades.
This feature means that the firm effects in wage changes may not capture so much the
differences in inflation expectations, but rather the differences in the wage drift between
firms. The dispersion of firm effects may then reflect the firm-level flexibility in wage
changes that positively contributes to the adjustment of the labour market, rather than the
errors concerning inflation expectations. To sum up, the method proposed by Groshen and
Schweitzer (1999) does not describe the essential features in the micro-level adjustment of
individual wages in the Finnish wage bargaining system. In particular, the expected vs.
surprise inflation analysis in the previous section reinforces our doubts about this
identification strategy in Finland.
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6. Procedure for rigidity estimates
This section briefly describes the methodology that is used in the International Wage
Flexibility Project to assess wage change histograms to determine the extent of nominal and
real wage rigidity in the labour market. Dickens and Goette (2005) and Dickens et al. (2006)
provide a detailed description of the protocol. The following discussion on the methodology
of the project is based on Dickens et al. (2006).
The protocol has two main elements. The first one is a correction for measurement error. It
extracts the estimated distributions of true wage changes from observed wage changes.
Hence, the true wage change distribution is an estimate of error-free presentation of observed
wage changes. The second main stage is the estimation of wage rigidities. It involves
comparing true wage changes with the notional ones. The notional wage change distribution
is the counterfactual situation in which there would be no wage rigidities that hinder the
adjustment of individuals’ wages.
6.1. Correction for measurement error
Observed wage changes contain errors, which has to be taken into account in the calculation
of measures for nominal and real wage rigidities, because measurement error in wage levels
seriously impedes the assessment of wage rigidity, because it creates spurious variance in
wage changes. For instance, there may timing problems in allocating hours and wages into
particular quarter in the manual wage survey data, which are then reflected in the hourly
wages calculated from these data.
The amount of measurement error in any data source is an empirical matter. There are
different ways to identify errors in the data. The correction technique applied in the
International Wage Flexibility Project does not require strong assumptions about the
underlying distribution of wage changes.12 The correction is based on the following
relationship between true wage changes and the observed ones:
(1) f o = T f t
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where f o is a vector of observed frequencies in each cell of the wage change histogram,  f t is
a similar vector for the true frequencies and T is a transition matrix whose columns are the
percentage of observations in each cell of the true distribution that will end up in each cell of
the observed distribution owing to measurement errors in wages. Inverting T and multiply
both sides of equation 1 by that inverse, gives
(2) T -1 f o = f t.
Hence, if the transition matrix T is known, the true wage change distribution can be recovered
from the observed distribution. This requires assumptions about the structure of errors, which
affect the structure of T. The method assumes that errors, when made, are independent and
have a two-sided Weibull distribution (Dickens et al. 2006).13 It is also assumed that the
probability of making an error is independent. Furthermore, it is assumed that the true wage
change is not autocorrelated, which implies that all autocorrelation in wage changes is due to
measurement error. Hence, the variance of measurement error can be estimated from the
negative autocorrelation of observed wage changes. There is earlier U.S. micro-level evidence
supporting this particular assumption (Abowd and Card 1989). Dickens et al. (2006) argue in
addition that the potential sources of positive autocorrelation, such as collective agreements
that are negotiated for several years, are swamped by the negative measurement error. The
method-of-moments is used to estimate the parameters of the error distribution, the fraction of
the population that is prone to errors, the fraction of those who are prone to errors that make
errors in that particular period, and the estimated true wage change distribution (i.e. the
elements of f t). Additional moments that allow the identification of parameters are obtained
from predictions about the frequency that people with wage increases (decreases) larger than
some value receive wage decreases (increases) smaller than another value. These ‘switcher
moments’ reflect measurement error, and the method minimizes a quadratic distance measure
between actual and predicted fraction of people switching.
6.2. Estimation of rigidities
To measure nominal and real wage rigidities, the generalized method of moments is used to
fit a simple model of wage changes to the error-corrected (true) wage-change histograms for
each data set year (Dickens et al. 2006). The method essentially uses the fraction of
observations in each cell of the wage change histogram as the moments. The model assumes
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that, in the absence of rigidity, log wage changes have a symmetric two-sided Weibull
distribution, which is referred to as the notional wage change distribution.14 Hence, in the
absence of wage rigidities, the mean wage change equals the median wage change. As a
result, all deviations from the symmetry are caused by the existence of nominal and real wage
rigidities.
To quantify the amount of nominal and real wage rigidities it is necessary to make additional
assumptions about the way that wage rigidities transform the notional wage change
distribution to the observed (true) distribution. A fraction of the population (r) is potentially
subject to downward real wage rigidity. If their notional wage change is below their or their
firm’s expected rate of inflation, they will receive a wage change equal to that expected rate
of inflation rather than equal to their notional wage change. The mean and standard deviation
of the expected rate of inflation in each year are also parameters of the model and they are
estimated separately for each year. In addition, a fraction of the population (n) is potentially
subject to downward nominal wage rigidity. Such workers who have a notional wage change
of less than zero, and who are not subject to downward real wage rigidity, receive a wage
freeze instead of a nominal wage cut.
The procedure used in the International Wage Flexibility Project yields estimates of the extent
of downward nominal wage rigidity (n) and of downward real wage rigidity (r). The measures
for nominal and real wage rigidity vary between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates perfect flexibility
(no one is constrained) and 1 indicates perfect rigidity (all workers potentially subject to real
rigidity are constrained). The definition of n is the fraction of workers who are not affected by
downward real wage rigidity, but who are affected by downward nominal wage rigidity. For
this reason, there is no a priori reason for n and r to be negatively correlated. In particular, the
measures for the extent of nominal and real wage rigidity are not reported as shares of all
workers. They are proportions of workers that are actually subject to particular type of rigidity
of those workers that are potentially subject to the rigidity considered.
We implement this procedure separately for each three sectors and each year that we have
data for: manual manufacturing workers 1986-2000, non-manual manufacturing workers
1986-2000, and the private service sector workers 1991-2001.
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7. Estimates for rigidities
7.1. Measurement error and limitations
This section documents the Finnish results based on the protocol for the estimation of nominal
and real rigidities. Dickens et al. (2006) provide a meta-analysis of the results covering all 16
countries that have taken part to the International Wage Flexibility Project. We concentrate on
the results based on the estimated (‘true’) wage change distribution that is corrected for
measurement errors in the data, rather than on the observed distribution or their comparison,
except for the non-manual workers for which we use measures based on observed
(uncorrected) distribution.15 The reasons are twofold. First, we have three different data sets
for different sectors/worker groups, so we need to concentrate on some set of results without
attempting too many comparisons. Second, estimated values for the probability of
measurement error imply quite low amounts of measurement error for manufacturing white-
collar and the service sectors. The error rate is 0.05 (5%) for these two sectors. The error rate
is calculated from the equation (1-p)c, where p is an estimate of the probability of making no
errors and c is an estimate for making an error if prone to error (see Dickens and Goette
2005). This means that for these sectors it should not matter much whether we use observed
or estimated distributions. On the other hand, there seems to be quite a lot measurement error
in wages in the blue-collar manufacturing data: the error rate is 0.25 (25%) for this sector.
This is reflected in the apparent gap between rigidity measures calculated from observed
versus estimated distribution and notable differences in the histograms for observed and
estimated wage changes for blue-collars. But if the difference is due to measurement error,
there is not much point in looking at uncorrected results.
The most likely reason for the presence of more measurement error for manual manufacturing
workers is the different wage concept, which is the hourly wage rate for blue collars as
opposed to monthly salary for other sectors. As of now, we do not know the exact sources of
measurement error in the hourly wages, since the method used here is the first time it has been
revealed to exist. The prevailing view is that all of the employer wage surveys behind our data
are accurate as such. However, the hourly wage is simply calculated from the wage bill and
hours worked during a quarter. Hence, some error in either wages or hours or most likely an
inconsistency between the two must be the source of error in the data.
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The definition of downward real wage rigidity adopted in the International Wage Flexibility
Project may be difficult to distinguish empirically from the effects of bargaining on wage
determination as discussed above (see also Dickens et al. 2006). Centralized wage bargains
set a floor for wage changes while allowing decentralized changes above the floor, often
called “wage drift”. The histogram for wage changes then resembles that for downward real
wage rigidity, but the spike will reflect the negotiated minimum real wage change rather than
the expected rate of inflation only. The estimation protocol restricts the expected rate of
inflation to fall within reasonable bounds for such an expectation (Dickens et al. 2006). For
countries with this sort of wage drift at play, it is possible to estimate considerable real wage
rigidity in years when the floor falls within a preset range for expected inflation, but not in
years when the floor is above that range. This inconsistency will also have spillover effects on
our estimates of nominal rigidity. Furthermore, it is difficult to separate nominal and real
wage rigidity from each other during the years of very low inflation, i.e. during most of the
late 1990s in Finland. However, this distinction is less relevant when inflation is very low,
because the effects of nominal and real rigidities on wages are essentially the same.
7.2.   The quantitative magnitude of micro-level wage rigidities
The median wage change has been strongly procyclical in all sectors, and the overall
development over time of the medians reflects strongly the development of inflation (Figure
7.1). In addition, underlying fluctuations in median wage changes have been also in other
respects largely similar across sectors. This is not a great surprise as such, because the period
is dominated by broadly-based collective labour agreements that have produced quite similar
real wage rises across sectors based on the rate of aggregate productivity growth. This is often
referred to as the “wage norm” applied in collective agreements. However, during the early
1990’s recession years the median worker experienced real wage declines. The real wage
increases of the median worker also seem smaller in late 1990s compared to late 1980s. The
measures for kurtosis and skewness of wage changes get typically high values in the years in
which there have been centralized agreements that have induced zero pay rise. In this sense,
such measures seem to capture rigidities produced by collective bargaining.
We report our estimation results for the amount of nominal and real rigidities as average
values over several years to obtain a clearer picture of the level and changes in rigidities,
because there have been large fluctuations in these measures from year to year. We use three
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periods; late 1980s (1986-1990), the recession years (1991-1993/1992-1994), and late 1990s
(1994-2000/1995-2001). The results in Figure 7.2 and Table 7.1 reveal that the amount of
nominal rigidity has been highest during the recession period of 1991-1993/1992-1994. This
reflects the nominal wage freeze implemented by the collective agreements during the great
depression of the early 1990s. The level of nominal rigidities has been highest in the service
sector, and virtually non-existent in the manual manufacturing sector.
Averages of real rigidities for the same three periods reveal that the amount of real rigidities
in wage changes has been smallest during the recession period 1991-1993/1992-1994. This is
shown in Figure 7.3 and Table 7.2. The level of real rigidities was lowest in the non-manual
and service sectors during this period. The amount of real rigidities has been highest for
manual manufacturing workers in late 1980s and late 1990s. It is notable that in late 1990s the
level of real rigidity has increased back to the late 1980s levels, despite the much higher level
of unemployment during late 1990s. On the other hand, this pattern over time in real rigidity
and unemployment makes it hard to argue, that real wage rigidities are the direct cause of
unemployment.
The amount of nominal rigidities over time across sectors is illustrated in Figure 7.4.
Measures of nominal rigidity indicate the existence of nominal wage rigidity only in some
years, mostly due to specific reasons related to those years (like wage freeze of 1992-1993
and a postponement of contract wage increases in 1997). Nominal wage rigidities seem to be
unimportant for manual manufacturing workers even in these years. This is consistent with
the histograms for wage changes that do not contain spikes at zero wage change for manual
manufacturing workers.
Respectively, the amounts of real rigidities over time across sectors are depicted in Figure 7.5.
They confirm the fact that the amount of real rigidities was at its lowest level during the great
depression of the early 1990s. Real rigidities have been high in all sectors during the periods
1994-1996 and 1999-2000, and in most years of late 1980’s in manufacturing. We also
regressed the measures of nominal and real rigidities on the changes in unemployment and
real GDP. These results give additional support that nominal rigidities have been high and the
real rigidities low during the depression years.
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To sum up, the estimates convey the picture that there has been a great deal of either real or
nominal rigidities in all sectors in most years. However, the constraint of real rigidity on wage
determination was relaxed considerably during the recession years. On the other hand,
nominal rigidity increased and therefore formed the ultimate limit to downward wage
flexibility.
In international comparison, the extent of real wage rigidity seems to be high in Finland
compared with the other European countries (Figure 7.6). In particular, the estimate for real
rigidity obtains the second highest value for Finland after Sweden (Dickens et al. 2006). It is
interesting that the amount of real wage rigidity is much higher in Finland than, for instance,
in Austria despite the fact that both of these countries have centralized labour markets. In
contrast, the amount of nominal wage rigidity does not seem to be particularly high in Finland
from the perspective of international comparison. The results also indicate a tendency for a
negative correlation between the real and nominal wage rigidity, but there are notable
exceptions to a monotone negative relation. In France and Sweden both rigidities are high and
in Germany low.
7.3. Macroeconomic sensitivity of wage changes to unemployment
In order to look at the macroeconomic flexibility of wage setting to economic conditions we
estimate simple Phillips curves or wage equations. That is, we regress the average change in
nominal wages on unemployment. Pehkonen (1991, 1999) provides earlier estimates for
Finland along this strand of research. We also use these regressions to evaluate the idea that
downward rigidities in wages make the adjustment of wages to economic conditions less
flexible. Since downward wage rigidities mean that wage change distributions become
asymmetric by shifting negative nominal and real wage changes upward in the distribution, it
means that the average wage change is higher with rigidities than without them. If the average
wage change responds negatively to unemployment, the wage changes will become more
constrained from below by rigidities when unemployment is higher. This implies that the
response of average wage change to unemployment is smaller than without rigidities. We
attempt to look at this effect by using the mean wage change from the estimated notional
distribution as the dependent variable in addition to the observed mean wage change. If
downward rigidities in wages prevent the adjustment of wages to economic conditions, the
unemployment coefficient should be larger (in absolute value) in a regression for the
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estimated mean, compared to the coefficient for observed mean (see Dickens and Goette
2005). The estimated mean of notional wage changes is obtained from the rigidity protocol.
Columns (1)-(2) in Tables 7.3-7.5 present the simple specifications with only an indicator for
years with industry-level bargains as an explanatory variable in addition to unemployment.
The results indicate a significant negative relationship between wage growth and
unemployment in all sectors. The unemployment effect on observed mean wage change is
about -0.4 in all sectors in column (1). The unemployment coefficients for the estimated mean
wage change in columns (2) are very close to the observed equations (marginally larger for
white collars and services, but somewhat smaller for blue collars). This is in contrast to the
idea that the responsiveness of wages to unemployment is prohibited by downward wage
rigidities. Rather, it seems that observed wage changes adjust to unemployment in the same
way as the notional wage changes that are not affected by rigidities.
Columns (3)-(6) augment the simple specification by including expected inflation and
productivity growth in the equation to capture the effects of inflation and productivity growth
in wage setting. We measure expected inflation alternatively by the consumer’s inflation
forecast from a Statistics Finland survey (columns (2)-(4)) or by the estimate of expected
inflation from the rigidity protocol (columns (5)-(6)). The inflation forecast is the expected
inflation one year ahead at the start of the period over which the wage change is measured.
Some experimentation indicated that the lagged productivity growth was more significant
than the current one, so we use it. It may be that the past observed productivity growth is
taken into account and rewarded in wage negotiations rather that expected productivity
growth during the contract period. For the service sector productivity growth is lagged two
periods as it seemed to work best. This could indicate that the wage setting in services follows
that of manufacturing sector’s by one year lag.
The unemployment effect in the augmented model becomes less significant, but usually
remains significant (at least at 10% level) when the estimate for inflation expectations is used.
The value of unemployment effect varies more between observed and estimated
specifications, but there is no systematic tendency for the effect to be larger on notional wage
changes than for observed changes. There is some evidence for this only in the service sector.
However, it is important to keep in mind that these augmented specifications may stretch the
data too far, because the number of observations is quite low. Another feature which may
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affect the results is the high correlation between expected inflation and unemployment during
the observation period: -0.91 for the inflation forecast and -0.81 for the estimated inflation in
blue collar data. This correlation partially explains the insignificance of most coefficients in
these models. Productivity growth affects wage changes positively in a fairly consistent
manner, with a coefficient of 0.2-0.5 in different models and sectors. In contrast, the effect of
expected inflation is extremely volatile, and is often negative. Finally, the effect of industry
level bargains is to increase wage growth compared to years with centralized bargains, a result
consistent with the earlier Finnish findings (see Alho 2002; Uusitalo 2005).
To sum up, we find hardly any evidence that the notional mean wage change would be more
sensitive to unemployment than the observed mean wage change (or observed median wage
change: we have estimated all models also with that and the results are very close to those
with observed mean). This would seem to indicate that although the measured real rigidity is
high, it is not notably undermining the adjustment of average wage changes to economic
conditions.
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8. Conclusions
This paper analysed the flexibility of the Finnish labour markets from the microeconomic
perspective by focusing on individual-level wage changes for job stayers. The study covered
the private sector workers by using three separate data sets obtained from payroll records of
employers’ associations. Two main conclusions from wage formation emerge. First, there has
been macroeconomic flexibility in the labour market. This means that average wage changes
negatively respond to an increase in unemployment and the downward real rigidity measure
declined during the worst years of early 1990’s recession. Consistent with this, a large number
of employees experienced a decline in their real wage during the great depression of the early
1990s when unemployment soared. This was put into effect by wage moderation through
collective labour agreements. Second, the evidence based on individual-level wage change
distributions reveals that especially real wages are definitely rigid in Finland. International
comparison supports this finding (Dickens et al. 2006). Hence, there is not much flexibility in
the labour market from the microeconomic perspective. In addition, the evidence points out
that individual-level wage changes have regained the high levels of real rigidity during the
late 1990s that prevailed in the 1980s, despite the continued high (but declining) level of
unemployment.
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Figure 1.1. Inflation and unemployment rate, 1961-2000.
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Figure 4.1. Illustration of nominal and real wage rigidity.
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Figure 4.2a. Observed wage change distributions for manual manufacturing workers 1986-1990. (Actual inflation is shown with black and
contract wage increase with grey.)
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Figure 4.2b. Observed wage change distributions for manual manufacturing workers 1991-1995. (Actual inflation is shown with black and
contract wage increase with grey.)
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Figure 4.2c. Observed wage change distributions for manual manufacturing workers 1996-2000. (Actual inflation is shown with black and
contract wage increase with grey.)
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Figure 4.3a. Observed wage change distributions for non-manual manufacturing workers 1986-1990. (Actual inflation is shown with black and
contract wage increase with grey.)
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Figure 4.3b. Observed wage change distributions for non-manual manufacturing workers 1991-1995. (Actual inflation is shown with black and
contract wage increase with grey.)
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Figure 4.3c. Observed wage change distributions for non-manual manufacturing workers 1996-2000. (Actual inflation is shown with black and
contract wage increase with grey.)
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
%
)
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516 17181920
1996
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
%
)
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516 17181920
1997
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
%
)
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415 1617181920
1998
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
%
)
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516 17181920
1999
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
%
)
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10111213141516 17181920
2000
50
Figure 4.4a. Observed wage change distributions for service sector workers 1991-1995. (Actual inflation is shown with black and contract wage
increase with grey.)
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Figure 4.4b. Observed wage change distributions for service sector workers 1996-2001. (Actual inflation is shown with black and contract wage
increase with grey.)
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Table 4.1. Proportion of employees that have experienced negative wage changes.
Nominal wage Real Wage
Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Manufacturing Services
Manual workers
Hourly pay
Non-manual workers
Monthly pay Monthly pay
Manual workers
Hourly pay
Non-manual workers
Monthly pay Monthly pay
1990-1991 16.9 2.0 2.4 60.1 47.8 20.8
1991-1992 36.4 2.7 5.4 69.5 87.2 81.5
1992-1993 20.6 5.4 3.9 57.8 74.4 83.1
1993-1994 8.4 1.4 4.7 11.8 14.5 69.8
1994-1995 5.0 1.2 2.7 6.5 2.3  4.2
1995-1996 10.4 3.3 2.8 12.3 4.8  4.0
1996-1997 23.3 2.7 4.8 48.2 61.3 74.3
1997-1998 11.4 1.3 3.4 18.7 6.4  5.7
1998-1999 11.4 3.5 3.9 17.5 7.6  6.1
1999-2000 6.8 1.6 3.4 33.7 34.9 38.6
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Table 4.2. The average wage decline for those employees that have experienced negative
wage changes.
Nominal wage Real Wage
Manufacturing Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Manufacturing Services
Manual workers
Hourly pay
Non-manual workers
Monthly pay Monthly pay
Manual workers
Hourly pay
Non-manual workers
Monthly pay Monthly pay
1990-1991 -5.4 -8.2 -15.4 -4.0 -2.1 -3.5
1991-1992 -3.5 -7.2 -8.6 -3.9 -2.6 -2.8
1992-1993 -3.8 -6.6 -12.0 -2.9 -2.2 -2.6
1993-1994 -5.7 -9.3 -11.8 -5.0 -1.7 -1.9
1994-1995 -5.8 -19.3 -13.5 -5.3 -11.6 -9.6
1995-1996 -5.0 -6.7 -13.4 -4.8 -5.2 -10.0
1996-1997 -2.9 -9.2 -9.7 -2.4 -1.6 -1.8
1997-1998 -4.6 -10.1 -10.7 -3.9 -3.4 -7.6
1998-1999 -4.7 -7.7 -11.2 -4.0 -4.6 -8.2
1999-2000 -5.2 -11.6 -12.8 -2.5 -1.2 -2.0
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Table 4.3. The Nickell-Quintini (2003) regressions for manufacturing manual workers.
Dependent variable: share of negative real wage changes
Median of real wage change -5.42** -4.36**
(-4.26) (-3.86)
Dispersion of real wage changes (P75-P35) -0.96 1.39
(-0.22) (0.38)
Inflation rate 1.49 1.61*
(1.54) (2.01)
Change in inflation rate -1.55 -0.43
(-1.15) (-0.36)
Dummy for the recession years (1991-1993) 0.13**
(2.70)
N 19 19
Adj R2 0.80 0.86
Notes: t-values in parenthesis: significance indicated by ** (5%), * (10%).
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Table 5.1. ANOVA results for annual wage changes for different sectors.
A. Manual Manufacturing workers, 1986-2000
Source of Variation Degrees of
Freedom
Marginal
Contribution
to SS
Percent of
Total Sum of
Squares
Percent of
Model Sum of
Squares
Marginal
F-Stat.
Region*year 29 637 13.8 44.6 6619
Occupation*year 12494 74.8 1.6 5.2 1.8
Joint occupation
and employer 160.5 3.5 11.2
Employer*year 22277 556.8 12.1 39.0 7.5
Model 34800 1429.1 31.0 100 12.4
Residual 960440 3187.2 69.0
Total 995240 4616.3 100
B. Non-manual Manufacturing workers, 1986-2000
Source of Variation Degrees of
Freedom
Marginal
Contribution
to SS
Percent of
Total Sum of
Squares
Percent of
Model Sum of
Squares
Marginal
F-Stat.
Region*year 29 693.5 18.1 60.0 10491.8
Occupation*year 1158 22.8 0.6 2.0 8.7
Joint occupation
and employer 40.1 1.0 3.5
Employer*year 34214 398.5 10.4 34.5 5.1
Model 35401 1154.9 30.2 100 14.3
Residual 1173065 2673.6 69.8
Total 1208466 3828.5 100
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C. Service sector workers, 1991-2001
Source of Variation Degrees of
Freedom
Marginal
Contribution
to SS
Percent of
Total Sum of
Squares
Percent of
Model Sum of
Squares
Marginal
F-Stat.
Region*year 21 458.9 16.6 60.8 9993.7
Occupation*year 581 14.7 0.5 1.9 11.6
Joint occupation
and employer 44.4 1.6 5.9
Employer*year 35251 236.9 8.6 31.4 3.1
Model 35853 754.9 27.4 100 9.6
Residual 916109 2003.1 72.6
Total 951962 2758 100
Notes: Occupation and employer (firm) effects are marginal effects, i.e. their contribution
to the Sum of Squares when all other effects are already included in the model. The Joint
occupation and employer effect is calculated by subtracting the marginal contributions of
occupation and employer (and region*year) from the Model Sum of Squares. This reflects
the inability of ANOVA to unambiguously divide observed wage changes to occupation
and firm components.
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Figure 5.1. Standard deviations of wage changes and residuals by sector, 1986-2001.
 Total STD of wage changes
year2
 Total SD, Production  Total SD, Non-Production
 Total SD, Service
85 90 95 100
.04
.06
.08
Residual STD
year2
 Resid SD, Production  Resid SD, Non-Production
 Resid SD, Service
85 90 95 100
.03
.04
.05
.06
.07
Notes: Standard deviations are from an ANOVA model for wage changes on firm and occupation (including
year and year*region interaction effects). Total STD of wage changes is the standard deviation of dependent
variable in this model, and Residual STD is the residual standard deviation.
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Figure 5.2. Standard deviations of firm and occupation effects by sector, 1986-2001.
Firm STD
year2
 Firm SD, Production  Firm SD, Non-Production
 Firm SD, Service
85 90 95 100
.01
.02
.03
Occupation STD
year2
 Occup SD, Production  Occup SD, Non-Production
 Occup SD, Service
85 90 95 100
0
.005
.01
.015
Notes: Standard deviations are for estimated marginal firm and occupation effects from an ANOVA model for
wage changes including year and year*region interaction effects.
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Table 5.2. Basic grease and sand regressions.
Occupation Standard Deviation
Pooled Production Non-Production Service
Cpip -0,008 -(0,21) 0,038 (0,59) -0,067 -(1,00) 0,068 (1,06)
Cpip^2 0,106 (0,39) -0,092 -(0,22) 0,509 (1,14) -0,644 -(1,40)
DNProd -0,004 -(9,87)
Dserv -0,005 -(9,45)
_cons 0,009 (6,24) 0,006 (2,97) 0,006 (2,59) 0,002 (1,25)
AdjR-sq 0.7656 0.1710 -0.0076 0.2230
Firm Standard Deviation
Pooled Production Non-Production Service
Cpip -0,094 -(1,20) -0,050 -(0,36) -0,163 -(1,15) 0,0353 (0,34)
Cpip^2 0,724 (1,36) 0,617 (0,66) 1,187 (1,27) -0,5427 -(0,74)
DNProd -0,006 -(6,21)
Dserv -0,008 -(7,89)
_cons 0,026 (9,70) 0,024 (4,91) 0,023 (4,72) 0,0159 (5,12)
AdjR-sq 0.6442 0.0969 -0.0018 0.2107
Residual Standard Deviation
Pooled Production Non-Production Service
Cpip -0,080 -(0,51) 0,057 (0,24) -0,120 -(0,41) 0,0268 (0,10)
Cpip^2 0,725 (0,69) 0,085 (0,05) 1,182 (0,61) -0,8348 -(0,44)
DNProd -0,010 -(5,53)
Dserv -0,010 -(5,05)
_cons 0,058 (10,78) 0,052 (6,41) 0,048 (4,82) 0,0477 (5,96)
AdjR-sq 0.4849 0.0726 -0.0240 0.1149
Notes: Dependent variables are standard deviations of occupation or firm effects, or the residual standard
deviation from ANOVA models. The explanatory variables are the sum of inflation and productivity growth
(Cpip) and its square (Cpip^2), and dummies for non-production (DNProd) and service sectors (Dserv) in the
pooled model that includes all three sectors. Constant (_cons) is reported. Appendix 1 contains the exact
definitions of macroeconomic variables that are used in the models. t statistics in parentheses. * significant at
5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.3. Grease and sand regressions with time trend (Trend) and its square (Trend^2).
Occupation standard deviation
Pooled Production Non-Prod Service
Cpip -0.045 -0.000 -0.125 0.079
(1.18) (0.01) (1.76) (1.17)
Cpip^2 0.288 0.073 0.827 -0.734
(1.14) (0.20) (1.82) (1.54)
Trend -0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.010
(1.31) (0.51) (1.41) (1.42)
Trend^2 0.127 -0.089 0.263 0.512
(1.23) (0.58) (1.38) (1.42)
DNProd -0.004
(10.86)**
Dserv -0.005
(9.58)**
Constant 0.135 -0.052 0.246 0.477
(1.49) (0.38) (1.48) (1.44)
Observations 41 15 15 11
R-squared 0.84 0.61 0.36 0.55
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Firm standard deviation
Pooled Production Non-Prod Service
Cpip -0.088 -0.059 -0.061 0.043
(1.03) (0.38) (0.40) (0.34)
Cpip^2 0.683 0.597 0.660 -0.593
(1.22) (0.60) (0.67) (0.66)
Trend 0.003 0.007 0.005 -0.001
(0.70) (0.87) (0.71) (0.11)
Trend^2 -0.158 -0.374 -0.275 0.074
(0.70) (0.89) (0.67) (0.11)
DNProd -0.006
(6.08)**
Dserv -0.008
(7.58)**
Constant -0.112 -0.281 -0.245 0.081
(0.56) (0.77) (0.68) (0.13)
Observations 41 15 15 11
R-squared 0.68 0.36 0.32 0.37
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.4. Grease and sand regressions with unemployment (unemp) and its square
(unemp^2).
Occupation standard deviation
Pooled Production Non-Prod Service
Cpip -0.015 0.026 -0.096 0.083
(0.48) (0.44) (1.86) (2.09)
Cpip^2 0.048 -0.133 0.567 -0.717
(0.22) (0.34) (1.65) (2.49)*
Unemp -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(2.75)** (1.58) (1.57) (2.74)*
Unemp^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.03) (1.30) (1.06) (2.36)
DNProd -0.004
(12.88)**
Dserv -0.004
(10.98)**
Constant 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011
(8.67)** (3.90)** (4.53)** (3.64)*
Observations 41 15 15 11
R-squared 0.88 0.53 0.61 0.82
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Firm standard deviation
Pooled Production Non-Prod Service
Cpip -0.073 -0.056 -0.112 0.061
(1.00) (0.50) (0.75) (0.59)
Cpip^2 0.387 0.315 0.779 -0.752
(0.76) (0.42) (0.78) (1.01)
Unemp -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(2.87)** (2.73)* (0.92) (1.47)
Unemp^2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.72)* (2.44)* (1.06) (1.47)
DNProd -0.006
(6.77)**
Dserv -0.007
(7.82)**
Constant 0.034 0.036 0.025 0.027
(9.55)** (6.73)** (3.52)** (3.33)*
Observations 41 15 15 11
R-squared 0.75 0.62 0.27 0.54
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.5. Grease and sand regressions with wage bargaining variables.
Occupation standard deviation Firm standard deviation
Pooled Pooled Pooled Pooled
Cpip 0.001 -0.010 -0.131 -0.132
(0.03) (0.24) (1.64) (1.74)
Cpip^2 0.043 0.118 0.964 0.959
(0.15) (0.42) (1.80) (1.89)
Indbarg -0.000 0.001
(0.86) (1.73)
Centind 0.000 0.002
(0.22) (2.42)*
DNProd -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006
(9.83)** (9.74)** (6.38)** (6.61)**
Dserv -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.008
(9.37)** (9.31)** (8.17)** (8.36)**
Constant 0.008 0.009 0.027 0.027
(5.99)** (6.16)** (10.11)** (10.48)**
Observations 41 41 41 41
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.70 0.73
Notes: Indbarg = an indicator for industrial-based contracts and Decentind = decentralization index.
These are reported in Table A2. t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.6. Grease and sand regressions with expected inflation and inflation surprise. (The
squared terms are included as indicated.)
Occupation standard deviation Firm standard deviation
Production Non-Prod Service Production Non-Prod Service
Inflforec -0.087 0.026 -0.115 -0.089 -0.012 0.136
(0.70) (0.24) (1.18) (0.39) (0.04) (0.62)
Inflforec^2 2.015 0.697 3.342 3.576 1.340 -1.478
(1.07) (0.42) (1.90) (1.04) (0.28) (0.38)
Inflsurp 0.084 -0.104 0.013 -0.011 -0.270 -0.223
(1.16) (1.62) (0.23) (0.08) (1.48) (1.75)
Inflsurp^2 -10.265 8.270 -10.956 -5.073 34.086 9.655
(1.22) (1.11) (1.65) (0.33) (1.62) (0.65)
Constant 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.023 0.016 0.013
(5.49)** (1.69) (3.76)** (7.50)** (3.87)** (4.54)**
Observations 12 12 11 12 12 11
R-squared 0.64 0.70 0.80 0.75 0.35 0.60
Notes: Expected inflation from consumer survey (Inflforec) and inflation surprise (inflsurp = actual inflation –
expected inflation). t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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Figure 7.1. Actual inflation (infl) and median wage change by sector (BC is blue collars,
WC is white collars and SW is service sector).
Actual Inflation and Median Wage Change by sector (observed)
year
 BCmedian  WCmedian
 SWmedian  infl
1985 1990 1995 2000
0
.05
.1
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Figure 7.2. Averages of nominal wage rigidities.
Table 7.1. The amount of nominal wage rigidities (averages over several years).
Manual
manufacturing
Non-manual
manufacturing
Services
1986-1990 0.00 0.11 ..
1991-1993 (1992-1994) 0.00 0.52 0.89
1994- (1995-) 0.00 0.18 0.14
Notes: Averages for services are from the years 1992-1994 and from the years 1995-2001.
Averages of nominal rigidity
0.000 0.200 0.400 0.600 0.800 1.000
Mean 86-90
Mean 91-93(92-94)
Mean 94-(95-) 
Service
Non-manual
Manual
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Figure 7.3. Averages of real wage rigidities by sector and period.
Table 7.2. The amount of real wage rigidities (averages over several years).
Manual
manufacturing
Non-manual
manufacturing
Services
1986-1990 0.80 0.45 ..
1991-1993 (1992-1994) 0.40 0.07 0.16
1994- (1995-) 0.80 0.58 0.67
Notes: Averages for services are from the years 1992-1994 and from the years 1995-2001.
Averages of real rigidity
0.000 0.200 0.400 0.600 0.800 1.000
Mean 86-90
Mean 91-93(92-94)
Mean 94-(95-) 
Service
Non-manual
Manual
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Figure 7.4. Evolution of nominal wage rigidities by sector, 1986-2001.
Nominal rigidity
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Services
Manual
Non-manual
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Figure 7.5. Evolution of real wage rigidities by sector, 1986-2001.
Real rigidity
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Services
Manual
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Figure 7.6. The amount of nominal and real wage rigidities in different countries (Source:
Dickens et al. 2006).
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Table 7.3. Sensitivity of wage changes to unemployment.
Blue Collar
(1)
Observed
mean
(2)
Estimated
mean
(3)
Observed
mean
(4)
Estimated
mean
(5)
Observed
mean
(6)
Estimated
mean
Unemployment(t) -0.389*** -0.310*** -0.316 -0.450 -0.429** -0.320*
(4.0) (3.24) (0.76) (1.08) (2.71) (2.00)
Productivity growth(t-1) 0.447 0.499 0.497* 0.426
(1.28) (1.43) (2.15) (1.78)
Expected Inflation(t) 0.250 -0.470 -0.082 -0.010
(0.23) (0.43) (0.18) (0.02)
Industry bargain 0.029** 0.033*** 0.020 0.025 0.020* 0.026**
(2.77) (3.28) (1.30) (1.66) (1.98) (2.45)
Constant 0.082 0.059 0.009 0.066 0.069 0.044
(7.99) (5.81) (0.92) (1.05) (2.60) (1.61)
Observations 15 15 12 12 15 15
Adj. R-squared 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.36 0.64 0.57
Notes: Expected inflation is the inflation forecast form consumer survey in columns 3-4, and the estimated inflation
in columns 5-6. Significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 7.4. Sensitivity of wage changes to unemployment.
White Collar
(1)
Observed
mean
(2)
Estimated
mean
(3)
Observed
mean
(4)
Estimated
mean
(5)
Observed
mean
(6)
Estimated
mean
Unemployment(t) -0.401*** -0.416*** -0.399 -0.184 -0.477** -0.456**
(4.65) (4.06) (1.05) (0.44) (3.07) (2.41)
Productivity growth(t-1) 0.401 0.395 0.423* 0.470*
(1.26) (1.13) (2.05) (1.87)
Expected Inflation(t) 0.046 0.458 -0.279 -0.131
(0.05) (0.42) (0.52) (0.20)
Industry bargain 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.026* 0.026 0.026** 0.031**
(3.57) (3.58) (1.91) (1.70) (2.81) (2.76)
Constant 0.086 0.066 0.069 0.015 0.085 0.056
(9.39) (6.14) (1.21) (0.23) (2.98) (1.63)
Observations 15 15 12 12 15 15
Adj. R-squared 0.65 0.61 0.56 0.48 0.71 0.65
Notes: Expected inflation is the inflation forecast form consumer survey in columns 3-4, and the estimated inflation
in columns 5-6. The estimated mean is from the observed distribution without measurement error correction.
Significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 7.5. Sensitivity of wage changes to unemployment.
Service sector
(1)
Observed
mean
(2)
Estimated
mean
(3)
Observed
mean
(4)
Estimated
mean
(5)
Observed
mean
(6)
Estimated
mean
Unemployment(t) -0.422** -0.443** -0.141 -0.572* -0.409* -0.504**
(2.68) (3.25) (0.61) (2.28) (2.13) (2.75)
Productivity growth(t-2) 0.215 0.354 0.431 0.273
(0.81) (1.23) (1.72) (1.14)
Expected Inflation(t) 1.03 -0.560 -0.028 -0.243
(1.36) (0.68) (0.07) (0.63)
Industry bargain 0.029** 0.038*** 0.022 0.027* 0.016 0.029*
(2.67) (4.07) (1.90) (2.08) (1.23) (2.38)
Constant 0.083 0.061 0.022 0.076 0.068 0.065
(4.30) (3.64) (0.59) (1.87) (2.24) (2.25)
Observations 11 11 11 11 11 11
Adj. R-squared 0.50 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.55 0.65
Notes: Expected inflation is the inflation forecast form consumer survey in columns 3-4, and the estimated inflation
in columns 5-6. Significance: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Appendix 1. Definitions of macroeconomic variables.
Variable Definition Source
Unemployment The unemployment rate, % Labour Force Survey by
Statistics Finland
Inflation (actual) Annual change in cost-of-
living index, % (1951==100)
Statistics Finland
Expected inflation Expected annual average
change in the inflation rate
during the following year, %
The Bank of Finland (Kari
Takala) based on consumer
sentiment surveys by Statistics
Finland
Productivity growth Annual change in labour
productivity in the private
sector, %
National Accounts by
Statistics Finland
Contract wage Annual contract wage change
separately for manufacturing
manual and non-manual
workers and for the private
service sector workers, %
For the years 1980-2000
based on Marjanen (2002),
and for the year 2001 based
on wage survey by TT
Decentralization index The share of trade union
members that are outside
central bargain, %
For the years 1980-1997
based on Ruuttu (1997), and
for the years 1998-2001 based
on information from SAK
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Appendix 2. Description of wage-setting institutions.
1. Dominance of collective bargaining
Finland is one of the Nordic welfare states with high labour taxes, extensive social
benefits and one of the highest rates of trade union membership and coverage of
collective wage agreements in the OECD, and with minimum increases of nominal
wages being determined by collective bargaining (Layard and Nickell 1999; Table A1).
The structure of the Finnish wage bargaining tends to involve a high degree of
coordination between both unions and employers, with a framework agreement being
determined centrally on a one- or two-year basis, followed by union level bargains in
the context of this framework agreement of labour market issues. (Santamäki-Vuori and
Parviainen (1996) and Vartiainen (1999) provide summaries of the Finnish labour
market institutions.) As one important outcome of collective agreements, wage
compression is high in Finland. In particular, Moisala and Uusitalo (2004) report based
on European Community Household Panel (ECHP) that dispersion in gross wages in
Finland is narrow in comparison with the other EU countries.
Labour market policy is the result of a close and long-term interplay between organised
agents and the government. This feature means that Finland provides an example, par
excellence, of a corporatist political and economic system (e.g. Vartiainen 1998). The
labour market parties and also other important economic and political actors are
comprehensively organised and co-operate in centralised wage bargaining and dialogue
on a broad range of issues related to economic and social policy. As a result, trade
unions and employer’s organisations explicitly take into consideration aggregate
economic conditions like the rate of inflation and the future growth prospects when
negotiating nominal wage increases.
Since 1968 the labour market organisations and the government have concluded
centralized income policy agreements in an effort to stabilize macroeconomic
development and to improve working conditions and the social security system. This
means that government is involved directly or indirectly in most negotiations on wage
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and employment terms and has introduced, for instance, income tax cuts in order to
moderate future wage increases. These tax cuts are quite often conditioned on the
success of the collective wage agreements to maintain price stability.
Around 70% of the salaried labour force belongs to trade unions nowadays. The wage
earners have altogether 81 trade unions belonging to three different central
organisations. The high unionisation rate is at least partly explained by the fact that
membership fees are tax deductible; the fees are mainly collected by employers and, in
particular, by the involvement of the unions in the administration of unemployment
insurance benefits. Accordingly, Pehkonen and Tanninen (1997) conclude that the trade
union density rate would fall considerably if earnings-related unemployment insurance
were cut to the level of the basic unemployment benefits.
There was no decline at all in the trade union density rate during the great depression of
the early 1990s (Figure A1). In contrast, there was a substantial increase in the trade
union density rate. The reason for this evolution is most likely an increase in the
perception of job instability among employees during the severe slowdown in aggregate
economic activity. After the depression, however, union density has declined by more
than 10 percentage points in less than ten years. This rate resembles the decrease in the
union density during the Thatcher years in the UK. Böckerman and Uusitalo (2006)
show that the decline has been caused by the emergence of an independent UI fund that
provides unemployment insurance without requiring union membership, which has
eroded the so-called Ghent system, where the unions administer government-subsidized
unemployment insurance funds. The changes in the composition of the labour force and
the changes in the labour market explain only about a quarter of this overall decline.
The coverage ratio of the collective bargaining in Finland is less exceptional compared
to the other countries, since the real impact of the collective agreements usually tends to
be stronger than would be implied by the crude unionisation rate in other OECD
countries. The French labour markets constitute a typical example of a country in which
the unionisation rate is low, but the coverage ratio of collective agreements is high. In
addition, relative to other European countries, the labour market regulation is not
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particularly strict in Finland (e.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991; Layard and
Nickell 1999; Table A1).
The Finnish ‘wage increase formula’ was formalised by the social partners and the
Ministry of Finance in the tri-partite Incomes Policy Commission in 1995 (Mermet
2001).16 The formula defines the scope for nominal wage cost increases as the sum of
the core inflation target (e.g. 2% per annum) and the average increase in productivity
across the whole economy. This means that nominal wages are not encouraged to adjust
to the changes in productivity that are specific to certain sectors. As a result of this,
wage changes have not followed the growth rate of labour productivity in booming
industries like electronics during the late 1990s. The tri-partite Incomes Policy
Commission orders reports on specific issues that are directly related to wage formation.
To sum up, collective bargaining dominates wage formation. Despite discussions and
pressures for changes in these institutions from time to time, the wage setting practices
can be described as quite stable over our period of analysis (1985-2001). Hence, it is not
possible to explain the changes in the amount of nominal and real wage rigidities over
the period by the changes in wage-setting institutions.
2. Wage formation
2.1. Wage structure
The Finnish wage bargaining has been overwhelmingly dominated by the collective
agreements (Tables A2-A3). The collective labour contracts (työehtosopimus, TES)
constitute the ultimate backbone of wage formation (Vartiainen 1998). They contain the
broad outlines of wage formation. The collective labour contracts are incomplete owing
to the fact that collective labour contracts cannot fully contain all possible
characteristics of various jobs in the diverse population of the Finnish companies. This
feature of the Finnish wage formation means that the collective labour contracts usually
contain a set of minimum wages (taulukkopalkka) at different job-complexity levels and
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educational levels. The complexity levels of various jobs are stipulated based on the
negotiations between employees and employers.
Collective agreements are widely binding in Finland. A national collective agreement
made for a given industry between a trade union and an employers’ federation is, by
definition, binding on all employers that belong to that particular federation. If about
half of the employees in the industry are in the service of these organized employers,
then the national collective agreement is universally binding. This means that the
collective agreement also applies to employers that are not members of the federation
that has negotiated the agreement. As a result, the coverage of collective bargains in
Finland is around 95% of all employees, one of the highest rates in the OECD (e.g.
Layard and Nickell 1999).
There is no statutory minimum wage legislation as such in Finland, but the minimum
wages of each binding collective agreement constitute an effective floor for wages in
that particular industry. In any given year, there is, therefore, a great number of effective
floors for nominal wages. Hence, the level of minimum wages differs across sectors. In
addition, there is some grading by age and experience of employees (Santamäki-Vuori
and Parviainen 1996). In particular, minimum wages that are stipulated in the collective
labour agreements tend to be lower for young employees. For these reasons, it is hard to
assess the impact of minimum wages on wage rigidities in Finnish case. Available
international comparisons tend to indicate that the effective minimum wages are not
particularly high compared with the average wage in Finland. It has been estimated that
the ratio of minimum wages to average wage in Finland is 0.52 (Layard and Nickell
1999). The same figure, for instance, in Italy is as high as 0.71.
2.2. Changes in wages
The outcomes of the collective bargaining can be structured as follows (e.g. Vartiainen
1998). The collective agreement (TES) contains an agreement on a general nominal
wage increase, most often stipulated as a percentual one, that is to be applied to all
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wages and salaries. At the same time, each wage bargain also updates the tariff wages
by the amount of the general rise. The general wage increase is usually interpreted as an
across-the-board increase of all existing wages and salaries including any individual or
firm specific wage components that are paid on top of the tariff wages. Hence, the final
impact of the wage bargain depends mainly on that general wage increase.
Along with the general rise, the collective agreements may include allowances for
specific purposes, for example low wage or female allowances with a purpose of
increasing wages for some worker groups more than by the general rise. Further, a
mixed pay rise formula (X% or Y euros at minimum) is quite often applied and it tends
to produce some wage compression. Alho and Pekkarinen (2004, pp. 14) observe that
there has been a gradual erosion of these solidaristic elements in wage formation during
the late 1990s. Employers and AKAVA (Confederation of Academic Professional
Associations) have demanded this.
2.3. Additional elements
There are additional elements in the wage formation (Vartiainen 1998). First, what the
individual unions and their employer counterparts agree on the structure of tariff wages
and salaries affects the pay of employees according to whether their baseline pay is near
to the tariff level. If tariff levels are increased by more than the general increase, the
final impact of the agreement is usually greater than the general increase if a large
proportion of workers were earning a wage somewhere near the tariff level. Second, the
so-called wage drift plays an important role in the wage formation (more details are
given in section 2.4 below). Third, during the 1990s selected provisions were added to
the collective agreements which have made it possible to agree locally about certain
issues like daily working hours in an effort to adjust the effective labour input of
companies. However, under the current law, these local agreements are legally
acceptable only if their terms exceed those agreed at national level (Mermet 2001).17
Hence, the minimum conditions cannot be repudiated by the conduct of local
negotiations. Therefore, these provisions provide flexibility upwards, but not
downwards that is needed to overcome economic hardships in companies. Hence, there
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is not much room for wage cuts within the current institutional setting of the labour
market, which are only possible by the mutual consent of employers and employees. In
summary, local negotiations as currently implemented in Finland do not undermine the
broad picture of collective wage formation.
2.4.   Wage drift and other elements of flexibility
Wage drift has, historically, accounted for around 30% of the total increase in earnings
(e.g. Vartiainen 1996; Marjanen 2002; Piekkola and Marjanen 2003). The magnitude of
wage drift is calculated as a difference between actual and agreed (at national or sectoral
level) nominal wage increases. This means that structural changes in the labour market
(for instance, a strong growth in high-wage industries during the recovery or layoffs of
low-wage employees during the economic slowdown) have an impact on the magnitude
of wage drift.
The evolution of wage drift has been procyclical over the period of investigation.
Hence, there is an increase in wage drift in the times of good macroeconomic
performance. The empirical micro-level studies show that wage drift responds mainly to
company-specific profitability (Piekkola 2001). Local agreements on wages that have
become more popular during the late 1990s are shown as a wage drift in aggregate wage
statistics (Mermet 2001).
The role of performance-related pay has increased in the labour market during the
1990s. Eiro (2001) documents that 36% of all employees in manufacturing are affected
by performance-related pay, the same figure is 9% for the state sector and 2.4% in the
municipal sector. Despite this, the performance-related pay covers only a small
proportion of the total earnings even in manufacturing, where it has been most
commonly adopted.18
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3.   Collective bargaining negotiations
3.1.   Income policy agreements
Collective bargaining rounds have typically started with a preliminary negotiation
between the central organisations in the context of the so-called Income Policy
Agreement (IPA; tulopoliittinen kokonaisratkaisu) (Table A2). This means that the IPA
has usually been considered for various reasons by the central organisations to be the
most preferred outcome of a bargaining round.
There is no formal legal basis for overall, economy-wide centralisation of wage
bargaining (Vartiainen 1998). This means that the central organizations cannot negotiate
agreements that would legally bind their member unions or employer federations. That
negotiation between central organisations, when successful, has produced a
recommendation for wage increases. The individual unions and employer organisations
have then rallied to that central framework agreement or rejected it, in which case
negotiations have been conducted separately at industry-level (the division of blue-
collar trade unions follows closely broad industries in manufacturing; white-collar
employees with academic qualifications are mostly organised according to professions).
This feature of wage formation means that it has been quite normal that some
unions/employers remain outside the centralised agreement. The IPAs have been more
comprehensive during the 1990s as a consequence of macroeconomic difficulties (see
column three in Table A2). This has lead to the concentration of individual-level wage
changes around the level of centralised agreement (see Figures 4.2a-4.2c; 4.3a-4.3c and
4.4a-4.4b of this report). As a result, the dispersion of individual-level wage changes
declined a lot especially during the great depression of the early 1990s (see Figure 5.1).
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3.2.   Industry-based contracts
When there is no sufficiently comprehensive willingness for a centralised IPA, the trade
unions and the employer organisations bargain and conclude deals to cover their own
sector (Vartiainen 1998). The outcomes concerning nominal wage changes are in these
cases based on a great number of industry-based contracts. The rejected outcome of an
Income Policy Agreement has usually put an effective floor to nominal pay rises in
these particular bargaining rounds. In the case of industry-based contracts, ’general pay
rise in contract’ (yleislinja) that is reported in Table A2 refers to pay rise that has been
the most common in that particular bargaining round. Uusitalo (2002) provides some
empirical evidence that the distribution of wages has been more compressed during the
times of collective agreements.
The implemented industry-based contracts have usually induced substantially larger
average increases in nominal wages compared with the outcomes of IPAs during the
1980s and the 1990s (Alho 2002; Uusitalo 2005). (The same result is reported in Tables
7.3-7.5 of this report.) This aspect is as expected, because the main motivation for the
IPAs is to moderate and coordinate diverse wage claims in the first place. This feature
of wage formation is consistent with the inverted U-shape hypothesis of centralisation
effects suggested by Calmfors and Driffill (1988). It has been shown that the metal and
the paper industries, which constitute the backbone of the Finnish export industries,
have traditionally been the leading sectors in nominal wage increases during the past
few decades (Hartman 1997).
3.3. Settlement of labour disputes
The government undertook a number of measures to improve the legislation concerning
labour relations and also the management of labour disputes after the end of the Second
World War. The outcome of these measures was that the Finnish Parliament in 1946
amended the Collective Agreements Act and passed the Labour Court Act. These Acts
came into force and the Finnish Labour Court (työtuomioistuin) started operating at the
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beginning of 1947. The existing Labour Court Act has been passed in 1974. Later
amendments concerning, for instance, the system of civil servants’ collective
agreements and the judicial procedure at the Labour Court have been passed.
The establishment of the separate Labour Court was firstly deemed necessary due to the
fact that general courts of law were regarded as being too slow to handle these issues.
Secondly, they were considered not to have the special expertise required in settling
often highly complex labour disputes arising out of collective labour agreements. In
addition, it was considered significant that a court which was composed of members
who represent the employers’ as well as the employees’ most important organizations,
could gain the overall confidence of the labour organizations in a more comprehensive
manner than the general courts of law. In this sense, the Labour Court is an important
part of the Finnish collective bargaining framework and its implementation. For
instance, the cases that are related to industrial peace in the labour market are tried at
the Labour Court. Hence, the issues tried at the Labour Court tend to cover a number of
employees at the same time. Finally, the positive experiences gathered in the other
Scandinavian countries, especially in Sweden, with their separate labour courts
contributed to the establishment of the Labour Court also in Finland.
There is the national conciliator (valtakunnan sovittelija) in Finland that aims to resolve
industrial disputes by prior negotiation. This is aimed to diminish the number of
breakdowns in industrial peace. The National Conciliators’ Office (valtakunnan
sovittelijan toimisto) is operated under the Ministry of Labour.
4. Emergence of wage moderation during the 1990s
Theory says that there should be a decline in the real wage level of employees in
response to a collapse in labour demand even in the labour market characterised by
collective bargaining. The downward movement of nominal and real wages was clearly
limited at the onset of the great depression of the early 1990s. In particular, because of
worsening export prices, the growth of real product wages turned out to be excessive in
1989-1991 (Kiander and Vartia 1996; 1998). Hence, the ex post real product wages
83
were higher than originally intended, due to lower than expected producer prices. The
result was an unexpected upsurge of real product wages, which deteriorated the
competitiveness of the Finnish companies. A surge in the unemployment rate and
depreciation of the markka finally stopped the growth of real wages during the early
1990s.
There was, however, significant wage moderation by using the instruments of the
centralized bargaining system during the depression. Nominal wages were frozen by
collective agreements over the period from 1992-1993 (as reported in Table A2). There
was even an attempt by the social partners to cut nominal labour costs by 7% in 1991 in
order to avoid currency depreciation. (The proposition to cut labour costs by 7%
included 3% cut in nominal wages and 4% transfer of pension contributions from
employers to employees.) However, this attempt failed because two major trade unions
delayed their support for the pact and the restlessness of the financial markets forced the
Bank of Finland to abandon the fixed exchange rate in November 1991 (Kiander and
Vartia 1998, pp. 367-368). After that episode the labour market organizations did not
accept any cuts in nominal wages, but agreed, for the first time since the Second World
War, to a two-year social pact without any nominal pay rises. Since inflation was slower
than expected and there was a continuation of a small but positive wage drift, this meant
that real wages were more or less unchanged in 1992-1994. However, increase in
income taxes and social contributions meant that the real after-tax incomes decreased by
approximately 3-6% per year in these years (see Kiander and Vartia 1998, pp. 291).
The average nominal increases in wages have evidently been moderate with respect to
an increase in labour productivity in Finland during the 1990s. In particular, during the
early 1990’s recession years the median worker experienced real wage declines (see
Figure 7.1 of this report). Hence, there has been a great deal of macro-level adjustment
and flexibility in the labour market. As a result, there has been a substantial (and it
seems permanent) decline in the labour share (i.e. the share of wages and salaries as a
percentage of nominal GDP) since the great depression of the early 1990s (e.g. Kyyrä
2002) (Figure A2). The moderate increases in nominal wages by the collective
agreements are the principal reason for the decline in the labour share from the macro-
economic perspective (Sauramo 2004).19 Holm and Romppanen (1999) conclude that
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these moderate increases in nominal wages have contributed to a quite rapid decline in
the unemployment rate during the same period, which has been the most important aim
of the moderation of the wage claims by means of the collective labour agreements in
the first place. This broad macroeconomic perspective based on the average evolution of
wages across individuals with respect to the growth rate in labour productivity is largely
excluded from our analysis of the micro-level rigidity of individual wages during the
1990s.
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Table A1. The selected features and outcomes of the Finnish labour market (Source:
CESifo; Dice). [http://www.cesifo.de/].
Features:
Centralisation of collective bargaining1 (1994) 2+
Co-ordination of collective bargaining2 (1994) 2+
Collective bargaining coverage3 (%) (1995) 95
The trade union density rate4 (%) (1994) 81
Employment protection strictness5 (the late
1990s)
2.0
Outcomes:
The employment rate6 (%) (2000) 67.2
Part-time employment7 (%) (2000) 10.4
Labour disputes8 (the average 1970-1999) 396
Earnings dispersion9 (D5/D1) (1996) 1.40
Performance related pay10 (1998) 36
Notes:
1 1=company/plant-level, 2=sectoral level, 3=central level. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
2 The degree of co-ordination includes both union and employer co-ordination. Each characteristic has been assigned a value
between 1 (for uncoordinated/decentralised) and 3 (for co-ordinated/centralised). Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
3 The number of employees covered by a collective agreement divided by the corresponding total number of wage and salary
earners. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997.
4 Trade union membership as a percent of wage- and salary earners (based on employed members only). Source: OECD
Employment Outlook 1997.
5 The average of indicators of employment protection strictness for regular contracts and temporary contracts. The United States gets
the index value of 0.2 and the employment protection strictness is at its highest level in Portugal, where the index gets the value of
3.7. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1999.
6 The employment rate is defined as employment divided by population aged 15 to 64 years. Source: Employment Outlook 2001.
7 Part-time employment is measured as part-time employment as a proportion of total employment. Part-time employment refers to
persons that usually work less than 30 hours a week in their main job. Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2001.
8 Lost working days per 1000 employees, annual average over the period 1970-1999. The OECD average is 230. Source: ILO,
EIRO, Eurostat, National Statistics, and Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln.
9 D1 refers to the upper earnings limits of the first decile of employees ranked in order of their earnings from lowest to highest. D5
corresponds to median earnings. The D5/D1 gets the value of 2.08 for the United States (1998). Source: OECD Employment
Outlook 1996; CESifo calculations.
10 The number of employees affected by performance related pay in the manufacturing industries (%). Source: EIRO, Observer 3’01.
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Figure A1. The evolution of the trade union density (Source: Böckerman and Uusitalo
2006).
Note: Thin lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Table A2. The labour market contracts, 1980-2000.
Year Contract type Centralization index2 Duration Contract started Index clause General pay rise in
contract (%)
Contract wage index
change (%), 4th
quarter to 4th quarter
1980 Industrial-based contracts 100 1 year 1.3.1980 / 1.10. 1980 NO 11.3 12.4
1981 Pekkanen 9.3.1981 / 1. phase 36 2 years 1.3.1981 / 1.9.1981 NO 7.0 8.3
1982 2. phase 36 .. 1.3.1982 / 1.10. 1982 NO 8.4 9.3
1983 Industrial-based contracts 100 1 year 1.3.1983 / 1.10. 1983 NO 5.6 7.6
1984 Pekkanen 28.3.1984 / 1. phase 23 2 years 1.3.1984 / 1.10. 1984 YES 4.0 4.6
1985 2. phase 23 1.3. 1985 3.8 5.4
1986 So-called VHS-contract 16.3.1986 / 1. phase 17 2 years 1.3.1986 YES 2.8 4.5
1987 2. phase 17 .. 1.3. 1987 NO 3.4 5.0
1988 Industrial-based contracts 100 2 years 1.3.1988 NO 5.3 8.0
1989 IPA1  15.9.1988 38 1 year 1.3.1989 YES 3.6 4.9
1990 Kallio 15.1.1990 / 1. phase 20 2 years 1.3.1990 YES 5.9 6.3
1991 2. phase 26 1.5.1991 NO 1.7 2.6
1992 Ihalainen-Kahri 29.11.1991
(Extension of prevailing contract to 31.10.1993)
6 2 years 1.3.1992 YES 0.2 0.0
1993 Revision of prevailing contract  30.11.1992 6 .. .. NO 0.6 0.1
1994 Industrial-based contracts 100 1 year 1.11.1993 NO 2.5 0.9
1995 Industrial-based contracts 100 1-2 years NO 5.0 5.4
1996 IPA  11.9.1995 / 1. phase 0 2 years 1.11. 1995 YES 1.8 2.4
1997 2. phase 0 .. 1.10.1996 NO 1.3 0.0
1998 IPA  27.11.1997 / 1. phase 5 2 years 1.1.1998 YES 2.1 2.7
1999 2. phase 5 .. 1.1.1999 NO 1.6 1.9
2000 Industrial-based contracts 100 1 year 1.3.2000 NO 3.1 3.2
2001 IPA, 1. phase 0 2 year 1.2. 2001 YES 3.0
Sources: Pehkonen and Santamäki-Vuori (1999), except years 2000-2001 added by authors. Changes in contract wage index are authors’ calculations based on data from the ETLA database.
Notes:
1 IPA is an acronym for Income Policy Agreement (tulopoliittinen kokonaisratkaisu, TUPO) which refers to a broad collective framework agreement on income and economic policy issues
(often including changes in taxation and/or social policy).
2 % of union members outside central bargain (Source: Ruuttu 1997). We are grateful to Jorma Antila concerning the estimates for the years 1998-2001.
3 The general pay rise in contract (%) and the annual change in the contract wage index (%) differ due to the changing timing of rises in contract wage that induces the so-called carry-over
effect from year to year.
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Table A3. The evolution of the collective wage bargaining, 1980-2000 (Source:
Golden, Lange and Wallerstein 2002).
Confederal involvement
in wage setting*
Government involvement
in wage setting**
Bargaining level***
1980 3 5 3
1981 9 9 4
1982 9 9 4
1983 3 5 3
1984 9 9 4
1985 9 9 4
1986 9 9 4
1987 9 9 4
1988 3 5 3
1989 3 5 3
1990 9 9 4
1991 9 9 4
1992 9 9 4
1993 9 9 4
1994 3 5 3
1995 3 5 3
1996 9 9 4
1997 9 9 4
1998 9 9 4
1999 9 9 4
2000 3 5 3
Notes:
*3=”Confederation(s) participates in tales or in formulation of demands for all affiliates.”
*9=”Confederation negotiates national wage agreement without peace obligation.”
**5=”Goverment recommends wage quidelines or norms.”
**9=”Formal tripartite agreement for national wage schedule without sanctions.”
***3=”Industry-level wage setting without constraints.”
***4=”Sectoral wage-setting without sanctions.”
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Figure A2. The share of wages and salaries of the GDP, 1948-1997 (Source: National
Accounts).20
40.0
42.0
44.0
46.0
48.0
50.0
52.0
54.0
48 51 54 57 60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96
90
Footnotes:
                                                          
1 Holden (2004) provides a survey of the literature.
2 Koskela and Vartiainen (1997) raised this issue in the Finnish discussion concerning the effects of EMU
on wage setting and employment.
3 Fehr and Gächter (2000) provide a survey on this issue. Keynes (1936) stressed the notion of fairness as
an important factor of wage formation.
4 Kiander and Vartia (1996), and Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) provide surveys of the great slump of
the early 1990s in Finland. Koskela and Uusitalo (2003) provide a discussion of the Finnish
unemployment problem in the European context.
5 Pehkonen (1999) provides an update.
6 The method presented by Kahn (1997) was tried in the International Wage Flexibility Project. It did not
produce meaningful results for Finland, because the assumption that the key aspects of the wage change
distribution are not changing over time, is not holding in the Finnish case.
7 E.g. Smith (2000) provides a discussion about the measurement error in wage changes in survey data.
8 The inclusion of movers across firms and occupations yields an increase in the dispersion of wage
changes. This feature is as expected due to the fact that there are no limitations for wage changes of job
movers in the institutional context of the Finnish labour markets.
9 The models are estimated covering the 1990s. Böckerman, Laaksonen and Vainiomäki (2003) document
and discuss the results in detail.
10 Uusitalo and Vartiainen (2005) also analyse the firm component in Finnish wages and wage increases
by using ANOVA models. There are two main differences between their analysis and ours, which make
the results not comparable. They combine the manual and non-manual data into one data set, and they do
not include occupation indicators in their analysis.
11 Groshen et al. (2004) report this finding for a number of countries in the International Wage Flexibility
Project.
12 Previous approaches to correcting for measurement error make strong functional form assumptions
about the residuals in true wage changes, or require high-frequency data on wage changes (Dickens et al.
2006).
13 A two sided Weibull distribution is defined by the following cumulative density function:
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The three parameters allow variation in the mean (µ), the dispersion (β), and the peakedness (α) of the
distribution (Dickens et al. 2006). All three parameters of the distribution are estimated in each year for
each sector.
14 Details for the justification of using Weibull distribution can be found in Dickens et al. (2006). Briefly,
examination of the true wage change distributions in the IWFP project (and some other researchers)
indicate that wage change distributions are more peaked and have fatter tails than the normal distribution.
Second, the upper half of the distribution (above median), which is presumably not affected by wage
rigidities, is well approximated by a Weibull distribution.
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15 The measurement error correction routine is based on the assumption of negative autocovariance of
wage changes, which is not true in a number of years in the non-manual data. To secure rigidity estimates
for all years we are forced to use the uncorrected distribution for this sector.
16  The Incomes Policy Commission drafts economic reports and estimates to assist in incomes policy
negotiations and decision-making. The Prime Minister's Office appoints members from representatives of
employee and employer organisations and expert members. The chairman and secretary are officials from
the Ministry of Finance. The Commission was established in the early 1970s.
17 Heikkilä and Piekkola (2005) report based on a recent survey that employers want the locally bargained
wage share to be around half of the total wage rise. In contrast, the majority of the employees want that
share to be in the region of 1-24%.
18 Snellman, Uusitalo and Vartiainen (2003) investigate the role of performance-related pay in the Finnish
manufacturing industries.
19 Maliranta (2002) argues that micro-level restructuring has played an important role in the decline of the
labour share during the 1990s.
20 We are grateful to Pekka Sauramo for this figure.
